Sumit Mendiratta

Rapido just declared WAR on the 30% commission food delivery model 🚨 For almost a decade, since food delivery platforms like Zomato & Swiggy scaled across India, restaurants have accepted a painful deal. If you want access to customers through these apps, you give away 25–30% of every order. Let’s say someone orders food worth ₹300. Around ₹75 goes as platform commission. About ₹20 goes as delivery charges paid by restaurants. Another ₹10–₹20 goes into packaging. And if the restaurant wants visibility on the platform, there are additional marketing spends on ads. By the time everything settles, the restaurant keeps roughly ₹180–₹190 from that ₹300 order. Now look at Rapido’s new product, Ownly, which recently launched citywide in Bengaluru. Restaurants are not required to pay any platform commission at all. Customers simply pay a delivery fee, while the restaurant keeps the entire order value. And restaurants responded fast. Around 20,000 Bengaluru restaurants joined within weeks. But the most interesting signal came before Ownly even launched. Swiggy previously owned a 12% stake in Rapido. Soon after Rapido began testing food delivery in August 2025, Swiggy exited. The stake was sold in September 2025 for roughly ₹2,400 crore to Prosus and WestBridge (about 2.3× return). Financially, it was a great exit. Strategically, the message was even clearer. Swiggy chose to walk away before Rapido entered its core battlefield. The company already operates: → ~5 million rides daily → ~2 million riders (“Captains”) → 400–500+ cities → 30–50 million monthly users Food delivery simply plugs into an existing logistics network. Right now, Rapido itself is burning roughly ₹40–45 crore every month while expanding. But the strategy is obvious. They’re attacking the one thing restaurants hate the most: COMMISSION!! For years, restaurants were told: “30% commission is the cost of growth.” Rapido just showed them a version of the market where that cost is ZERO! And once restaurants see that…Good luck convincing them to go back.

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Gurugram-based proptech startup OfficeBanao has raised nearly $4 million (around Rs 36 crore) as part of a $7.7 million funding round led by Lightspeed Venture Partners, with participation from Mangum II and Medra Family. The round values the startup at about $70 million post-money. Founded in 2022 by Tushar Mittal along with Akshya Kumar and Divyanshu Sharma, OfficeBanao operates a technology-enabled platform for commercial office interiors and workspace buildouts. follow for more Piyush Singh

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upGrad set to acquire Unacademy in an all-stock deal • Term sheet signed • 100% share swap structure • Break fee clause included • Valuation to be disclosed after closing • Gaurav Munjal to continue as CEO Unacademy also has $100M + cash reserves.

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Dunzo's downfall can be attributed to several key factors: - Failure in Quick Commerce: Dunzo's attempt to become an ultra-fast grocery delivery platform, competing with Swiggy's Instamart, Zomato's Blinkit, and Zepto, ultimately failed due to high infrastructure costs, operational demands, and stiff competition. - Mounting Losses and Debt: The company's losses ballooned from ₹464 crore in FY22 to ₹1,801 crore in FY23, with accumulated debt of around ₹600 crore, making recovery difficult without external intervention. - Over-reliance on Investors: Dunzo's dependence on investors and inability to raise funds led to a significant decline in its valuation, from $770 million to $25-30 million. - Mismanagement and Strategic Missteps: The company's decision to shift focus from its core hyperlocal delivery model to quick commerce proved challenging, and its technological solutions failed to deliver results in the real world. - Reliance Investment Backlash: The $240 million investment from Reliance Industries in 2022 provided temporary relief but created new challenges, including disagreements over funding and strategic direction. - External Pressures: Dunzo faced legal issues, including an insolvency application filed by creditors and delayed salary payments to employees, further exacerbating its financial woes. - Financial struggles: Despite raising over $450 million in funding, Dunzo faced significant financial difficulties, including a substantial loss of ₹1,801 crore in FY23, up from ₹464 crore in FY22. The company's high cash burn rate and inability to secure additional equity funding exacerbated its financial woes. - Intense competition: Dunzo struggled to compete with well-funded rivals like Zepto, Blinkit, and Swiggy Instamart, which offered similar services with deeper pockets. This intense competition eroded Dunzo's market share, with Blinkit leading at 46%, Zepto at 29%, and Swiggy Instamart at 25%. - Operational cutbacks and layoffs: Dunzo reduced its operations and market presence over two years, leading to widespread layoffs and salary delays for employees. This ultimately affected the company's ability to deliver services efficiently. - Leadership changes and departure of key personnel: The departure of cofounder and CEO Kabeer Biswas, who joined Flipkart to lead its quick commerce venture, Minutes, marked a significant blow to Dunzo. Other cofounders, including Mukund Jha, Dalvir Suri, and Ankur Agarwal, had also exited the company. - Creditor issues: Dunzo's creditors, including Reliance Retail and Google, explored acquiring the startup but ultimately didn't pursue it. The company's unpaid dues led creditors to take legal action, approaching the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). These factors cumulatively contributed to Dunzo's shutdown, with its app and website displaying error messages and leaving hundreds of vendors, employees, and delivery workers unpaid. #Dunzo #reliance #Quicklogistic #startupfailure

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SCOOP: Palmonas is set to raise Rs 200 Cr in a Series B led by XPONENTIA Capital, with Vertex participating. The new round comes at a 3.8X valuation premium. Its FY25 revenue surged 40X to Rs 39 Cr, while the firm’s profit stood at Rs 4.3 Cr. Break by Mukul Manchanda https://lnkd.in/gEJAjCmp

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So OYO's third attempt at going for the IPO has fallen apart. This time, it's Softbank which has refused to go ahead, asking the company "to first improve its earnings". While this is great news for retail investors. What does it mean for OYO's founder, its employees, and the company itself? Short answer: 1. The founder could be forced out anytime now 2. Another lot of employees could be fired, and 3. The company will be run by management driven by investors, mainly Softbank The core history behind this starts in 2019, when Agarwal personally bought back ~ $1.5 B worth of OYO shares from early investors (like Sequoia, Lightspeed) through a Cayman Islands entity called RA Hospitality Holdings. That debt ($1.2B of which was financed via debt from Japanese & international banks) was reportedly guaranteed by SoftBank, which was already a major investor in OYO. In that transaction, Softbank played both sides of the trade: It guaranteed Ritesh's loan to facilitate the deal, while also benefiting from the pump in valuation being the largest shareholder. Solely because of that transaction, OYO's valuation had reached $9.6B. However, at the time, reports also said that "Ritesh personally borrowed ~ $1.2B from a consortium of banks, while the remaining ~$300 Mil came from his own equity and funds." But that was a joke, of course. He never had that kind of money. It was basically a leverage play on his existing shares, routed through an offshore Cayman entity, essentially leading to a Book-entry equity injection of his shares counted again in new form. And then began the attempts of dumping this ponzi on retail investors. In 2021, OYO tried to IPO at a $12B valuation. This was brought down to $10B, before the whole plan eventually got stalled. In Aug 2022, the valuation was dialled back to $7-8B, because the whole company was looking at going for a toss if it didn't inject money ASAP. In Oct 22, DHRP addendum was filed, and the company got the SEBI approval by March. But now the valuation estimates were at $5-6B. The IPO was cancelled. Then came January 2024, where the company's valuation was marked at $2.5B in an emergency liquidity injection situation. It raised some $35M to prevent itself from going totally bust (this was pitched as a "pre-IPO" round). Finally, in January 2025, the third IPO plan was laid out (updated DRHP). Which was cancelled just yesterday. Now that the IPO has been canceled, what we're looking at is URGENT repayment of: 1. $383M personal loan by Ritesh Agarwal (First tranche of the total ~$2.2B loan used for the founder-led buyback), and 2. $465M of the Term Loan B taken by OYO. Since both of these loans were contingent on the IPO; without that, what you're basically looking at is Softbank stepping in to: 1. Pay for Ritesh's loan and taking control of his shares sooner or later, and 2. Make the company "more efficient", so it can pay the $70M/yr interest on the Term Loan (its PAT was $25M last year). This is it.

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$700M Just Landed Nexus Ventures closed its eighth fund. $700M for India and US startups. Seed to Series A. AI, enterprise software, consumer, fintech. Their portfolio: Zepto, Delhivery, Rapido, @Apollo If you're building in these spaces, the capital is there. The question is whether your traction is. #VentureFunds #Investments #Startups #Capital #Build

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10 indian companies that you might not know were yc companies: 1. groww (W18) 2. meesho (S16) 3. razorpay (W15) 4. zepto (W21) 5. orange health labs (S20) 6. khatabook (S18) 7. cashfree payments (S17) 8. lokal (S19) 9. okcredit (S18) 10. innov8 (S16)

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The Partnership Paradox: Why Your 7 A.M. Uber Still Cancels It’s 7:15 AM. Laptop bag ready, coffee untouched, three apps open — Uber, Ola, Rapido. Not to see if a ride will come, but to see how long the circus will last today. The first request goes out. No one accepts. The app suggests a ₹50 “tip” to “increase my chances.” Ah yes — a modern-day bribe wrapped in UX design. Finally, a driver accepts. Then cancels. Then another accepts. Cancels again. By the third attempt, fares have surged, patience has vanished, and coffee’s gone cold. If you commute daily in India, you’ve lived this loop — frustration in 10-minute installments. And yet, this isn’t chaos. This is design. Or at least, a design that outgrew its discipline. The “Partner” Problem No One Talks About Uber doesn’t hire drivers — it creates partners. Sounds empowering, right? Except this freedom cuts both ways. When you make someone a “partner,” you share the profits — but not always the purpose. The driver becomes a free agent in a system built on shared responsibility. No surge? Cancel. Long pickup? Cancel. Low fare? Cancel. And just like that, a “partner model” becomes a permission model for unpredictability. The 6 A.M. Logic of Cancellation … What feels like unreliability to the customer is actually rational economics to the driver: ·        Low demand = lower fare per km ·        Empty runs = wasted fuel ·        No guaranteed minimum = every minute counts The system doesn’t reward showing up. It rewards waiting for better math. Freedom Without Feedback Is Friction … Rohan Ghorpade recently wrote about Uber’s “Driver Wanted” sign — how it was never about jobs but ecosystem design. He’s right. It was genius marketing — until governance stopped keeping up. Because here’s the thing: Freedom without feedback doesn’t create ownership — it creates optionality. And when everyone in a system optimizes for self, the system itself starts to fail. The Real Issue Isn’t Cancellation — It’s Calibration … Drivers aren’t the problem. Design is. Partnerships are supposed to mean shared upside and shared accountability. But when the structure is tilted toward autonomy, reliability becomes collateral damage. Uber built freedom as structure. Quick commerce built structure as control. And somewhere between the two, trust got lost in translation. The CalmOps Takeaway … Platforms love the language of “partners,” but partnership without rhythm isn’t freedom — it’s fatigue dressed as flexibility. Because in the end: You can scale people. You can scale profit. But if you don’t scale accountability, you’ll keep scaling chaos. #Leadership #SystemThinking #Operations #AutomationStrategy #CalmOps #Uber #Ola #Rapido #Governance #GigEconomy #StructureIsStrategy

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Startups Raised $134 Mn This Week 22 Deals | 1 M&A Here's Series wise funding details Series B SuperK, a consumer services startup, raised $11.5 Mn in a Series B round from 3STATE Ventures, Mithun Sacheti, Shubman Gill, Blume Ventures, and Xeed Ventures. Series A Netrasemi, a semiconductor startup, raised $12.4 Mn in a Series A round from Zoho Corporation and Unicorn India Ventures. EduFund, a lending tech startup, raised $6 Mn in a Series A round from Cercano Management and MassMutual Ventures. EVeez, an electric MaaS startup, raised $5.4 Mn in a Series A round from Michael & Susan Dell Foundation, Caret Capital, ThinKuvate, Ev2 Ventures, Barbershop With Shantanu, SailThru Ventures, and ah! Ventures. Enlite Research, a vertical SaaS startup, raised $5.3 Mn in a Series A round from Avaana Capital and Claypond Capital. iTuring.ai, an application layer AI startup, raised $5 Mn in a Series A round from Dallas Venture Capital and Mela Ventures. Hudle, a vertical SaaS startup, raised $2.5 Mn in a Series A round from Sky Impact Capital, Physis Capital, Atrium Venture, Blue Tokai, Mahesh Bhupathi, and Gaurav Kapur. Pre-Series A ANNY, a D2C startup, raised $1.2 Mn in a Pre-Series A round from Atomic Capital. Inbound Aerospace, a spacetech startup, raised $1 Mn in a Pre-Seed round from Speciale Invest and Piper Serica. ApClub, a hyperlocal services startup, raised $231K in a Pre-Seed round from Curefit and Pranay Jivrajka. Seed Kluisz.ai, an application layer AI startup, raised $9.6 Mn in a Seed round from RTP Global, Unicorn India Ventures, Blume Founders Fund, Climber Capital, Ritesh Agarwal, Ritesh Malik, and others. Escape Plan, a D2C startup, raised $5 Mn in a Seed round from Jungle Ventures and Fireside Ventures. Grexa AI, an application layer AI startup, raised $1.8 Mn in a Seed round from Utsav Somani, DeVC, Bharat Founders Fund, Vernalis Capital, and others. Ammunic Systems, a defence tech startup, raised $1.1 Mn in a Seed round from India Accelerator and Finvolve. Plenome , a vertical SaaS startup, raised $752K in a Seed round from Ovington Capital Partners, AADI, and Manish Gandhi. Undisclosed Series Gupshup, a horizontal SaaS startup, raised $60 Mn from Globespan Capital Partners and EvolutionX Debt Capital. SUGAR Cosmetics, a D2C startup, raised $5 Mn from Anicut Capital, Stride Ventures, and L Catterton. Bharatsure, a fintech SaaS startup, raised $694K from Inflection Point Ventures, Capital A, and Atrium Angels. Coluxe Fine Jewellery, a D2C startup, raised an undisclosed amount from Startup Sherpas, Ajai Chowdhry, Tej Kapoor, Sairee Chahal, and others. Roast Foods, a D2C startup, raised an undisclosed amount from Pagariya Exports Pvt Ltd. Magma, a manufacturing solutions startup, raised an undisclosed amount from GVFL Limited. KlugKlug , a marketing agency startup, raised an undisclosed amount from undisclosed investors.

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📊 PhonePe shutting down Pincode seems to prove it: e-comm to fintech works but fintech to ecomm struggles 📊 The big news this week. PhonePe, one of India's leading players in payments & fintech shut down Pincode, which was its ambitious play into getting into B2C commerce, built on ONDC, India's "ecomm as a service" rail (DPI stack) The initial logic of B2C fintechs (Paytm, PhonePe) venturing into commerce seemed to play on the logic of “hey! I have a captive user base. Why should I only facilitate payments? I can sell them other stuff!" But that didn't play out: PhonePe’s Pincode experiments, and Paytm Mall all stumbled, and eventually shut down. However, the reverse has seemed to be quite successful, where big ecomm players are moving into fintech. Over the past few years, we’ve seen Amazon and Flipkart transition from traditional e-comm giants into full stack fintech players: 🚀 Amazon ✅ 2017 - PPI wallet license ✅ 2019 - TPAP (Amazonpay) ✅ 2024 - PA license (domestic) and PA-CB (imports) ✅ 2025 - Acquired Axio (NBFC) 🚀 Flipkart: ✅ 2016 - Acquired PhonePe (UPI App + PPI) ❌ 2022 - Lost PhonePe’s PPI license post split ✅ 2024 - Launched Super money UPI app (separate entity) ✅ 2025 - Acquired BharatX (BNPL as a service infra player) ✅ 2025 - Secured an NBFC license ❓ 2025 and beyond: Payments play is plausible considering FK & group companies (Cleartrip + Myntra) scale 🛒 Big reason for this is that you have "fintech as a service" players, allowing players to launch their own branded products on top of whitelabeled infra. What we don't have is "ecomm as a service." A plug & play platform of buyers + sellers that anyone can plug into and leverage. 🛒 ONDC was meant to bridge that gap. But in reality, the ONDC experience remains fragmented. To actually win in ecomm, one needs deep control over supply chains, merchant onboarding, logistics, returns, and customer experience. There’s no player owning the full stack, and placing interoperability above user experience backfired in ONDC's case. Three years post launch (since 2023), success stories are rare: Juspay’s Namma Yatri being the exception, not the rule. 🛒 Not to say that every ecomm player is going after the fintech play. There are challenges - regulatory complexity is one. To operate as a fintech, you need a license from RBI which is increasing compliance burden and oversight. Zomato’s retreat is a case in point: It secured a PA and PPI license in early 2024, but later surrendered both, and withdrew its NBFC application. Yet plenty of e-comm players stand poised to go full-stack: Meesho, MakeMyTrip, Nykaa, Jio, Tata Neu, Zomato (again), Swiggy, even Zepto got the GMV volume to make fintech a logical next act. The e-comm to fintech trajectory does seem increasingly viable and doing or not doing it is more of a strategic call. Fintech to e-comm faces systemic friction, and without something like “e-comm as a service,” it may remain stalled. 🧠 Deep dive in the comments

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Two startups. Same market. Same chance. One raised too early. The other was too late. The outcomes will surprise you 👇🏻 Snapdeal→ Raised Funds Too Early Snapdeal initially raised large funds and positioned itself as a leading e-commerce player in India. What they did: Aggressive expansion, diversified offerings, heavy rebranding, and multiple acquisitions. Problems faced: - Execution errors & poor integration of acquisitions - High cash burn and costly decisions - Service failures, delayed deliveries, and eroded customer trust - Fierce competition from Amazon and other well-funded players Result? Growth became unsustainable, financial stress escalated, and Snapdeal lost market share. 📌 Lesson: Raising big too early can drive unfocused growth, operational chaos, and high burn, hurting competitiveness. Byju’s→ Raised Funds Too Late Byju’s prioritized building product quality and acquiring customers organically before raising large funding rounds. What they did: Developed curriculum, improved tech, and scaled cautiously with limited capital. Problems faced: - Slower early growth - Pressure to balance scale with quality - Competitive pressure from better-funded rivals - Later rounds required huge scaling expectations How they overcame it: Focused on unit economics, product innovation, and raised larger rounds later to fuel massive expansion. 📌 Lesson: Late funding slows growth but disciplined focus and strong execution make it highly effective. Timing matters in fundraising. Too early risks scaling before you’re ready. Too late risks missing growth. Make sure your business model is solid and scalable first.” _ _ _ P.S. Want to raise funds to scale your startup? Fill this form and let’s help you become funding-ready👇 https://lnkd.in/gjqKsyb8

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Elitecon International's move is massive. Every quarter, this mid cap is rewriting what scale looks like. From Rs 548 crore annual sales to Rs 3,735 crore in just half a year. → Not speculation, not hype, just execution at breakneck speed. This is the kind of business move that separates survivors from dominators. Mergers that create scale, not press releases. Elitecon isn't winning by luck. It's winning by consolidation. Three entities merging in. Deloitte managing the process. Operational efficiency about to multiply. This isn't trend chasing growth. It's strategic growth done right. The stock has already delivered 774% returns from its 52 week low. 9,750% in 3 years. But here's what matters more than the numbers: the company is building for the long term. Stronger balance sheet. Better market positioning. Earnings visibility that institutions demand. From tobacco products to international markets. From Rs 11.43 to Rs 99.89. From small scale to Rs 15,000 crore market cap. This isn't a viral story. It's a value creation story. NCLT approvals pending. Deloitte guiding. Management executing. The rest is just watching it unfold. Disclaimer: For informational purposes only, not investment advice.

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In 2020, BigBasket made ₹3,794 Cr in revenue, at that time, Zepto and Blinkit didn’t even exist. Fast forward to FY 25: BigBasket’s B2C arm, saw its turnover fall 3%. Meanwhile, losses surged BigBasket’s losses for that unit rose to ₹1,851 crore. In the quick commerce space today, Blinkit commands ~ 44-46% market share, followed by Zepto, and BigBasket’s “Now / Instant” share is a small sliver. BigBasket was once India’s grocery king — today, it’s scrambling for relevance in the age of 10-minute delivery, dark stores & consumer impatience. Meanwhile, Blinkit + Zepto + Instamart are hitting 4+ million daily orders (March 2025 numbers) — Blinkit alone delivers ~1.65–1.75 million orders/day. BigBasket’s “now” offering (BB Now / BB Instant) is clocking 0.4–0.5 million daily orders. #startup Why Blinkit / Zepto Are Growing Faster — The Differences. Speed / Promise: Blinkit / Zepto 10-minute delivery via dense network of dark stores. BigBasket: Traditional slotted delivery, constrained reach. Model & Assets: Blinkit / Zepto Asset-light dark store + micro-fulfillment, lean inventory. BigBasket: Full inventory model, big warehouses, higher capital cost. Consumer Habit: Blinkit / Zepto Impulse / top-up purchases (midnight snacks, forgotten items). BigBasket: Planned shopping, full cart, more deliberation. 🎯 Lessons for Founders & Builders. When consumer expectations shift, you can’t cling to legacy models. Speed is not a gimmick — it becomes the moat. Asset-light + hyperlocal is the play in dense cities. Don’t let diversification distract core excellence. You must fight for the last mile — that’s where scale dies.

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🚨 Rapido’s Food Delivery Launch Raises Serious Questions for Swiggy’s Investment 🚨 As the #Co‑Founder & #CEO of BrainShaala - No. 1 Skill Development Company, I’ve always emphasized that strategic investments must anticipate the future. Swiggy’s ~12% stake in Rapido acquired via a $180M investment in 2022 is now under review as Rapido enters food delivery with its Ownly pilot in #Bengaluru. What began as partnership potential is turning into direct competition. Key developments: #Rapido is offering restaurants nearly half the commission charged by #Swiggy and #Zomato, using a fixed-fee model that could lure partners away . Swiggy’s net loss doubled to ₹1,197 crore in Q1 FY26—making capital allocation ever more critical  . In its shareholder letter, Swiggy confirmed it's actively re-evaluating its stake in Rapido due to conflict of interest  . 🔍 If I were in Swiggy’s shoes, here’s how I’d think: Assess core value vs conflict: Holding this stake might yield returns but at what cost to strategic focus? Explore redefined terms: Could a narrower collaboration still exist (e.g., mobility-only)? Prioritize operating profitability: With Instamart and #food #delivery burning #cash, reallocating resources may be necessary  . 💬 My Take: Strategic investments aren’t just about financial returns they reinforce (or undermine) your core business. Swiggy now stands at a crossroads: Hold and hedge, redefine the partnership path, or exit to protect the legacy and future of its food delivery engine. What would you do if you were in Swiggy’s position exit the stake or hold tight? Share your insights. As someone who’s built business strategy around anticipating disruption, I’m keen to follow your thoughts. For more insights into startup dynamics and market strategy, let's connect and discuss! #StartupEcosystem #StrategicInvesting #FoodDeliveryWar #BusinessStrategy #SwiggyRapido #LinkedIn

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PhonePe is now targeting a valuation of $9-10.5 bn for its IPO, according to Reuters. This would represent up to a 25% discount to its last primary valuation of $12 bn, and about 40% below the reported target valuation of $15 bn. It is also closer to Paytm’s market capitalisation, which has hovered mostly between $8-10 bn over the past few months. It has now come down to $7.3 bn following the recent market crash. Both companies now have similar revenues, though Paytm has reported higher profits. With the valuation cut, it will be interesting to see if PhonePe can avoid the curse of decacorn IPOs. Paytm, which was listed in 2021, still trades about 50% below its IPO price. Swiggy, listed in 2024, currently trades around 25% below its IPO price and 21% below its QIP price. #payments #ipo #digital #UPI #phonepe #paytm #walmart #fintech

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SaaS-based flex workspace aggregator Stylework has raised Rs 30 crore ($3.39M) in a pre-Series B round led by Equentis Angel Fund at a pre-money valuation of Rs 250 crore ($28.5M). The round also saw participation from Karekeba Ventures, LetsVenture Fund, MoneyVyapaar, and other existing investors. The funds will fuel its AI-driven SaaS marketplace, expansion into domestic and international markets, and leadership hires across product, business, and enterprise growth. Stylework connects enterprises with coworking and managed office operators across 125 cities, covering over 5,000 centres with 70,000+ seats sold. #stylework #flexworkspace #saasstartup #preseriesb #fundraisingnews #workspaceaggregation #coworking #managedoffices #startupfunding #growthstory #indiastartups #saasindia #digitalworkspace #enterprisegrowth #aiworkspace #workspaceanalytics #proptech #flexibleoffice #businessinnovation #scaleups

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𝗞𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗮 𝗥𝗮𝘀𝘁𝗮 𝗣𝗮𝗸𝗸𝗮 𝗥𝗮𝘀𝘁𝗮 𝗔𝗿𝗷𝘂𝗻: B2B product management is like driving on Noida’s smooth roads, yaar. Customers sign annual contracts. Retention is almost guaranteed for a year. Game simple hai: keep delivering value, beat the market. B2C type AARRR ki chinta nahin. 𝗗𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗮: Simple kyun lagta hai? Because contracts buy you time, not loyalty. Renewals feel easier only because procurement cycles are slow. The why is inertia - companies hate switching once they’ve sunk time and effort. But the moment value delivery slips, inertia breaks. Renewal is re-acquisition. 𝗡𝗶𝗸𝗵𝗶𝗹: Also consider this: decision makers buy a vision, but users live the daily reality. Agar activation fail ho gaya, executives feel the gap. That’s why adoption in month one can decide retention a year later. Imagine rolling out Slack in your firm but employees continue using WhatsApp. 𝗔𝗿𝗷𝘂𝗻: Hmm. Referrals though? Not explicit like B2C. No viral loops. 𝗗𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗮: Because B2B purchases carry personal risk. No one wants to say ‘I invited this tool’ and then take the blame if it fails. Referrals are quieter - a VP who trusts you takes you along to their next company. That’s why they’re subtle, private, but powerful. 𝗡𝗶𝗸𝗵𝗶𝗹 (𝗻𝗼𝗱𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴, 𝗽𝘂𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗱𝘀 𝘁𝗼𝗴𝗲𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿): Exactly. So you can’t deny the AARRR funnel for B2B businesses. Acquisition, Activation, Retention, Referral, Revenue - sab hai. Bas the why behind the weights is different. Acquisition skews sales-driven because careers and reputations are on the line. Referrals flow through exec networks because risk is personal. And PMs? We’re held most accountable for Activation and Retention, because those are the stages where product experience alone decides success. Mange it well and you’re on Noida’s roads. Don’t and you’re on the ones in Gurgaon on a rainy day.

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