Secure your dependencies. Ship with confidence.

The script is clearly designed to exfiltrate sensitive IAM security credentials from an AWS instance to a remote server. This behavior is highly malicious and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 58 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

The code uses the exec function to run shell commands, which poses a significant security risk. It could potentially execute malicious code if the input to exec is manipulated. Redirecting output to /dev/null to hide execution details is suspicious.

Live on npm for 50 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits malicious behavior by collecting sensitive system information and sending it to suspicious external URLs without user consent. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on PyPI for 5 hours and 58 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Executing a Markdown file as a Node.js script is highly unusual and could be a security risk. It is recommended to review the contents of the 'README.md' file to ensure it does not contain any malicious code.

Live on npm for 12 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is an orchestration client for offensive tooling (Empire + Metasploit integration). It builds stagers, creates listeners, and deploys/executes payloads on remote targets either by instructing a Metasploit session to run the payload or by executing the payload over SSH. It also provides functions to execute modules or shell commands on connected Empire agents. Behavior is consistent with malware/post-exploitation actions (implant deployment, remote command execution). There is no obfuscation in the source, but the functionality is inherently dangerous and should not be included or executed in environments that must remain secure. No hardcoded credentials are visible in this file, but it relies on SETTINGS which contain credentials; network interactions to Empire and Metasploit are normal for the tool's purpose. I assign high confidence that this package facilitates malicious activity and high security risk if present in a dependency tree used in production environments.

This setup.py is highly dangerous: it clones and executes remote code with sudo during package installation and removes traces. Installing this package would allow arbitrary remote code to run on the host with elevated privileges. Do not install or run this package. Treat it as a supply-chain compromise and remove any installations performed by it; audit systems where it was run.

This script is a high-risk launcher: it unconditionally fetches Python code from a hardcoded remote repo and executes it locally via a shell-invoked Python process while passing unsanitized user inputs directly into the shell command. Even if the upstream repository is currently benign, the pattern enables trivial supply-chain compromise and shell injection. Mitigations: remove runtime download-and-exec; if fetching is necessary, pin and verify cryptographic hashes or signatures, validate content, avoid os.system (use subprocess with argument lists or importlib), sanitize inputs, and add error handling and logging. Treat this module as unsafe in security-sensitive environments until hardened.

The code is highly obfuscated and cannot be analyzed with confidence for its intended functionality. The obfuscation raises suspicion, however, no explicit malicious behavior can be identified from the given code snippet. More information would be required to make a definitive assessment.

Live on PyPI for 44 days, 2 hours and 22 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is strongly obfuscated and uses dynamic code generation/execution and anti-analysis constructs (e.g. building/evaluating 'while (true) {}' via constructor). There is no direct evidence of network exfiltration, hardcoded secrets, or filesystem/OS command use in the supplied fragment, but the dynamic evaluation patterns make it capable of executing other payloads at runtime. Treat this module with caution: if found in a dependency, require full deobfuscation and a review of the strings/code produced at runtime before trusting it in production.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This code contains a high-risk command injection vulnerability: it concatenates user-supplied file paths and kwargs directly into a shell command passed to os.system without quoting or validation. The usage() helper further risks executing an unintended binary via PATH. There is no evidence of obfuscation or explicit malicious payloads in the fragment, but the pattern enables arbitrary command execution if any input is attacker-controlled. Recommend refactoring to use subprocess with argument lists, validate/whitelist kwargs and file paths, and use an explicit absolute path to the executable.

This fragment appears to be part of a legitimate DOS/pDOS post-processing tool for Quantum ESPRESSO, but it uses multiple high-risk patterns: executing external Python files (exec(open(...).read())), copying and injecting variable content into a script and then executing it, and using bare excepts that suppress errors. These behaviors make the module vulnerable to supply-chain or local-file-tampering attacks: if an attacker can modify files in main_dir or dir_files (or influence the variables used to build filenames), they can achieve arbitrary code execution with the same privileges as the user running this script. I did not find explicit malicious payloads (no networking/exfiltration, no reverse shell code, no hardcoded secrets), so the code itself looks more insecure than intentionally malicious. Recommendation: avoid exec on arbitrary files; validate and/or cryptographically verify any scripts before executing; minimize use of globals and prefer importing modules safely; sanitize inputs and fail loudly rather than swallowing exceptions. Also review the rest of the project for places that set the variables used to build filenames. Note: the fragment contains multiple syntax errors and appears truncated which reduces certainty of the analysis.

Live on PyPI for 23 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is functionally a remote code execution backdoor: it accepts arbitrary Python code over a TCP connection and executes it in-process, returning stdout/stderr (including tracebacks) to the caller. It presents a high security risk — an attacker with network access can run arbitrary commands with the host process's privileges, read/write files, perform network exfiltration, and establish persistence. Do not run this code on any machine with sensitive data or network access. Remove or restrict it, require strong authentication, sandbox execution, enforce strict resource limits, and avoid executing untrusted input.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

This file intentionally conceals executable code in a base64-encoded, zlib-compressed blob and executes it automatically at import time. That design prevents auditability and is a high-risk pattern in a software supply chain context. Treat the package as untrusted until the decompressed payload is extracted and reviewed in a secure analysis environment. Do not import or run this module in production or on sensitive systems without prior containment and code review.

The code is designed to collect and transmit system information to external endpoints without user consent, which is indicative of malicious behavior. The hardcoded endpoints and the nature of the data being sent pose a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 15 hours and 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Best report identifies a concrete, high-risk sink (js/function tag in YAML) enabling dynamic code execution via the Function constructor. This constitutes a clear supply-chain/runtime risk if untrusted input is accepted and processed. The overall risk is elevated; mitigation should include removing or sandboxing the js/function path, implementing strict whitelist/validation for YAML content, and enforcing safe parsing practices or avoiding dynamic code generation from untrusted sources.

This source file is part of a command-and-control/implant client (Sliver) that loads alias manifests and associated binary payloads from disk and instructs remote beacons to execute them (sideload, spawn DLL, execute assembly). That is explicit remote code execution functionality. There are no signs of code obfuscation or hidden credential harvesting inside this file, but the module provides high-risk capabilities: if an attacker can place or tamper with alias manifests or binary files on disk (or compromise the RPC/backend), they can cause arbitrary code execution on connected targets. Treat as dangerous functionality for any environment that is not explicitly intended to host offensive tooling.

This file is an HTTP client for the Sliver implant C2 framework. It implements session bootstrapping, encrypted communication, polling, and closing behavior for a remote implant. The code is intentionally designed for covert network communication with a controller and therefore is malicious in the context of normal applications. Specific security concerns include predictable nonces due to math/rand, potential logging of sensitive data when compiled with debug, and in-memory handling of proxy credentials. If found in a package dependency for benign software, it should be considered a high-severity supply-chain compromise and removed or blocked.

The script is clearly designed to exfiltrate sensitive IAM security credentials from an AWS instance to a remote server. This behavior is highly malicious and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 hour and 58 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

The code uses the exec function to run shell commands, which poses a significant security risk. It could potentially execute malicious code if the input to exec is manipulated. Redirecting output to /dev/null to hide execution details is suspicious.

Live on npm for 50 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits malicious behavior by collecting sensitive system information and sending it to suspicious external URLs without user consent. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on PyPI for 5 hours and 58 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Executing a Markdown file as a Node.js script is highly unusual and could be a security risk. It is recommended to review the contents of the 'README.md' file to ensure it does not contain any malicious code.

Live on npm for 12 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is an orchestration client for offensive tooling (Empire + Metasploit integration). It builds stagers, creates listeners, and deploys/executes payloads on remote targets either by instructing a Metasploit session to run the payload or by executing the payload over SSH. It also provides functions to execute modules or shell commands on connected Empire agents. Behavior is consistent with malware/post-exploitation actions (implant deployment, remote command execution). There is no obfuscation in the source, but the functionality is inherently dangerous and should not be included or executed in environments that must remain secure. No hardcoded credentials are visible in this file, but it relies on SETTINGS which contain credentials; network interactions to Empire and Metasploit are normal for the tool's purpose. I assign high confidence that this package facilitates malicious activity and high security risk if present in a dependency tree used in production environments.

This setup.py is highly dangerous: it clones and executes remote code with sudo during package installation and removes traces. Installing this package would allow arbitrary remote code to run on the host with elevated privileges. Do not install or run this package. Treat it as a supply-chain compromise and remove any installations performed by it; audit systems where it was run.

This script is a high-risk launcher: it unconditionally fetches Python code from a hardcoded remote repo and executes it locally via a shell-invoked Python process while passing unsanitized user inputs directly into the shell command. Even if the upstream repository is currently benign, the pattern enables trivial supply-chain compromise and shell injection. Mitigations: remove runtime download-and-exec; if fetching is necessary, pin and verify cryptographic hashes or signatures, validate content, avoid os.system (use subprocess with argument lists or importlib), sanitize inputs, and add error handling and logging. Treat this module as unsafe in security-sensitive environments until hardened.

The code is highly obfuscated and cannot be analyzed with confidence for its intended functionality. The obfuscation raises suspicion, however, no explicit malicious behavior can be identified from the given code snippet. More information would be required to make a definitive assessment.

Live on PyPI for 44 days, 2 hours and 22 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is strongly obfuscated and uses dynamic code generation/execution and anti-analysis constructs (e.g. building/evaluating 'while (true) {}' via constructor). There is no direct evidence of network exfiltration, hardcoded secrets, or filesystem/OS command use in the supplied fragment, but the dynamic evaluation patterns make it capable of executing other payloads at runtime. Treat this module with caution: if found in a dependency, require full deobfuscation and a review of the strings/code produced at runtime before trusting it in production.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This code contains a high-risk command injection vulnerability: it concatenates user-supplied file paths and kwargs directly into a shell command passed to os.system without quoting or validation. The usage() helper further risks executing an unintended binary via PATH. There is no evidence of obfuscation or explicit malicious payloads in the fragment, but the pattern enables arbitrary command execution if any input is attacker-controlled. Recommend refactoring to use subprocess with argument lists, validate/whitelist kwargs and file paths, and use an explicit absolute path to the executable.

This fragment appears to be part of a legitimate DOS/pDOS post-processing tool for Quantum ESPRESSO, but it uses multiple high-risk patterns: executing external Python files (exec(open(...).read())), copying and injecting variable content into a script and then executing it, and using bare excepts that suppress errors. These behaviors make the module vulnerable to supply-chain or local-file-tampering attacks: if an attacker can modify files in main_dir or dir_files (or influence the variables used to build filenames), they can achieve arbitrary code execution with the same privileges as the user running this script. I did not find explicit malicious payloads (no networking/exfiltration, no reverse shell code, no hardcoded secrets), so the code itself looks more insecure than intentionally malicious. Recommendation: avoid exec on arbitrary files; validate and/or cryptographically verify any scripts before executing; minimize use of globals and prefer importing modules safely; sanitize inputs and fail loudly rather than swallowing exceptions. Also review the rest of the project for places that set the variables used to build filenames. Note: the fragment contains multiple syntax errors and appears truncated which reduces certainty of the analysis.

Live on PyPI for 23 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is functionally a remote code execution backdoor: it accepts arbitrary Python code over a TCP connection and executes it in-process, returning stdout/stderr (including tracebacks) to the caller. It presents a high security risk — an attacker with network access can run arbitrary commands with the host process's privileges, read/write files, perform network exfiltration, and establish persistence. Do not run this code on any machine with sensitive data or network access. Remove or restrict it, require strong authentication, sandbox execution, enforce strict resource limits, and avoid executing untrusted input.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

This file intentionally conceals executable code in a base64-encoded, zlib-compressed blob and executes it automatically at import time. That design prevents auditability and is a high-risk pattern in a software supply chain context. Treat the package as untrusted until the decompressed payload is extracted and reviewed in a secure analysis environment. Do not import or run this module in production or on sensitive systems without prior containment and code review.

The code is designed to collect and transmit system information to external endpoints without user consent, which is indicative of malicious behavior. The hardcoded endpoints and the nature of the data being sent pose a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 15 hours and 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Best report identifies a concrete, high-risk sink (js/function tag in YAML) enabling dynamic code execution via the Function constructor. This constitutes a clear supply-chain/runtime risk if untrusted input is accepted and processed. The overall risk is elevated; mitigation should include removing or sandboxing the js/function path, implementing strict whitelist/validation for YAML content, and enforcing safe parsing practices or avoiding dynamic code generation from untrusted sources.

This source file is part of a command-and-control/implant client (Sliver) that loads alias manifests and associated binary payloads from disk and instructs remote beacons to execute them (sideload, spawn DLL, execute assembly). That is explicit remote code execution functionality. There are no signs of code obfuscation or hidden credential harvesting inside this file, but the module provides high-risk capabilities: if an attacker can place or tamper with alias manifests or binary files on disk (or compromise the RPC/backend), they can cause arbitrary code execution on connected targets. Treat as dangerous functionality for any environment that is not explicitly intended to host offensive tooling.

This file is an HTTP client for the Sliver implant C2 framework. It implements session bootstrapping, encrypted communication, polling, and closing behavior for a remote implant. The code is intentionally designed for covert network communication with a controller and therefore is malicious in the context of normal applications. Specific security concerns include predictable nonces due to math/rand, potential logging of sensitive data when compiled with debug, and in-memory handling of proxy credentials. If found in a package dependency for benign software, it should be considered a high-severity supply-chain compromise and removed or blocked.