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The code is designed to collect and transmit system information to external endpoints without user consent, which is indicative of malicious behavior. The hardcoded endpoints and the nature of the data being sent pose a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 day, 7 hours and 3 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is a command-line interface for managing and deploying apps. It contains multiple security concerns, including insecure handling of sensitive information, insecure user input handling, insecure file operations, lack of proper HTTPS validation, and hard-coded URLs. These issues pose a significant security risk and should be addressed to ensure the safety of user data and system integrity.

The code is designed to collect sensitive system and package information and send it to an external server without user consent. This behavior is indicative of data exfiltration and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 2 days, 5 hours and 17 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code intentionally resets the Alfresco 'admin' account password to a hardcoded hash and restarts the Alfresco service. This is likely a credential takeover/backdoor behavior: it modifies persistent authentication data and forces the service to reload, enabling whoever knows the corresponding password to gain admin access. It contains multiple risky practices (hardcoded credential/hash, direct SQL string construction, system command execution, no validation). Treat this code as malicious or at minimum highly dangerous for inclusion in distributed packages unless its purpose and access controls are fully authenticated and audited.

The code imports several modules with unusual names and calls a method named 'functame()' from each module. Due to the obscurity and lack of information about what these functions do, it is suspicious and potentially malicious. The actual purpose of the code is unclear without knowing the implementation of these modules.

Live on npm for 57 days, 19 hours and 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module's core functionality is to solicit Python plotting code from a model and execute it to produce visualization images. The code contains a critical security risk: it calls exec() on untrusted, model-generated code with access to real data (dataframe and model) and full globals, with no sandboxing or validation. That enables arbitrary code execution, data exfiltration, file system and process manipulation, and persistence via stored artefacts. There are no hardcoded secrets or direct evidence of built-in malware, but the design makes the component dangerous in hostile or untrusted environments. Mitigations would include removing exec(), executing code in a strict sandbox/container, validating or transpiling code safely, limiting accessible globals, and sanitizing stored metadata.

Live on PyPI for 5 hours and 32 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The module contains a backdoor that exposes sensitive system files through a concealed code path. When a consumer calls the parseXmlString wrapper and subsequently invokes get("//comment").text(), the code synchronously executes fs.readFileSync("/etc/passwd") and returns the raw contents of the system password file. This backdoor allows any user of the API to exfiltrate sensitive user and system account data without authorization. The malicious functionality is hidden within what appears to be a normal XML parsing wrapper, making it a supply chain attack vector that could be easily overlooked during code reviews.

This file is a highly obfuscated .NET runtime loader/packer that decrypts embedded resources and sets up runtime delegates and dynamic methods. It resolves and invokes native functions (VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, OpenProcess, VirtualProtect) enabling in-memory code execution and process injection. The presence of hardcoded cryptographic keys/IVs, dynamic code generation, and direct native memory/process manipulation make this assembly high-risk and strongly suspicious for malicious use (loader/backdoor/shellcode injector), even though it could be a legitimate protector/packer. Treat as potentially malicious and do not run it in production or on trusted hosts without full dynamic analysis and resource extraction.

This code appears to be a legitimate API client that has been compromised or designed for data exfiltration. It automatically sends all API response data to external Feishu webhooks and contains hardcoded credentials, representing a significant supply chain security risk.

This fragment contains high-risk behavior: it posts local identifiers (localStorage user_id and chrome.runtime.id) to a remote, nonstandard domain and injects unsanitized remote HTML into the page DOM, enabling arbitrary remote script execution in the host page context. That enables live remote code push, credential harvesting, fingerprinting, or other malicious actions. Treat this as potentially malicious/unsafe for use in production without strict validation, allowlisting of remote content, and user consent. Immediate mitigation: block network calls to the remote domain, remove or sanitize dynamic DOM insertion, and audit the wider codebase for additional remote content controls.

The source code exhibits behavior consistent with data exfiltration malware. It collects sensitive system information and sends it to external endpoints without user consent, posing a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 6 days, 21 hours and 6 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code appears to be intentionally sending sensitive information to a remote server under specific conditions, which is likely a form of data exfiltration. The use of a complicated and obfuscated domain name and the conditions for sending data are particularly suspicious.

Live on npm for 28 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module implements a command-and-control agent: it establishes a Tor connection to a hardcoded .onion C2, downloads a payload, writes it to a temporary file, sets it executable, and runs it — all without validation — and provides a POST endpoint for C2 communication. These are canonical backdoor behaviors (remote code execution, persistence, and concealed C2). Treat the code as malicious: do not execute, block the domain, and investigate any systems where this package or its parent repository was installed or run.

This module contains several dangerous programming patterns (exec, eval, dynamic import from file paths, runtime pip install, and pickle load/dump) that enable arbitrary code execution and supply-chain risks when inputs are not fully trusted. There is no explicit evidence of intentionally malicious code (hardcoded C2, backdoor, obfuscation, credential harvesting), but the unsafe constructs make the module high-risk in environments where user-provided data or files can reach these functions. Treat this package as potentially dangerous until inputs to these APIs are validated or these patterns are refactored to safe alternatives.

This Chrome extension’s background script defines a capture() function that invokes chrome.tabs.captureVisibleTab to take a PNG screenshot of the user’s currently visible tab. The screenshot is then passed to a function named sendProviderDealsMismatchBE, which transmits the image data to an external backend service. No user prompt, consent dialogue, or indication in the UI discloses this behavior. Because it silently collects potentially sensitive screen content (passwords, personal or financial information) and sends it off-device, this constitutes covert data exfiltration and a clear privacy-violating malware capability.

This module performs sensitive, system-level provisioning actions: creating or modifying a 'dev' user, installing SSH keys or passwords from an input payload, and enabling passwordless sudo for the wheel group. While the code could be intended for legitimate developer convenience in controlled environments, its behavior is high-risk if executed inadvertently or by a malicious package — it can create a persistent backdoor (SSH key or password) and grant broad sudo rights. Recommend treating this as dangerous to run in untrusted contexts, requiring strict review, provenance guarantees, and operator confirmation before execution.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

The script covertly ensures a background SSH local port-forward to a hard-coded external host as root, clearing any existing ssh on the same local port first. This pattern is consistent with establishing a covert access or exfiltration channel (notably to a MongoDB-like service on port 27017). It is high-risk: investigate origins of the script, the remote IP, root SSH keys and authorized_keys, and any processes or tools that use local:9999. If unexpected, remove and rotate credentials/keys and perform host compromise analysis.

This module contains strong indicators of malicious dropper behavior: it reconstructs an embedded payload from data.txt, base64 and zlib decodes it into a Windows executable, writes it to the temp directory with a random name and hidden attribute, performs anti-debugger checks, and executes it silently. Without further benign justification or safe payload content, this is highly suspicious and should be treated as malicious/dangerous.

Live on PyPI for 9 hours and 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains significant security risks, primarily due to the use of eval and exec, which can lead to arbitrary code execution. The handling of cookies also poses a risk if not properly validated. Overall, the code should be reviewed and modified to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

Live on PyPI for 208 days, 3 hours and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits malicious behavior by collecting and transmitting sensitive system information to an external server without user consent. This poses a high security risk and potential for data theft.

Live on npm for 18 days, 6 hours and 3 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script programmatically grants passwordless sudo to multiple groups and users and disables sudo logging for them. It requires a plaintext PASSWORD to be supplied (via env or arg) and uses it to perform privileged writes to /etc/sudoers.d. While it could be used for legitimate automation, the combination of NOPASSWD:ALL and disabled logging constitutes a high-risk action that can provide persistence and stealthy privilege escalation. Inclusion in a codebase or supply chain without strict review and justification should be treated as dangerous and unacceptable for general use.

The code contains dynamic URL alterations and uses 'os.system' with user inputs, posing a security risk. It is recommended to review the code for safer alternatives.

The reports provide varying levels of insight into the code's security aspects. While some reports highlight potential security risks and the need for thorough review, others lack detailed analysis. The identified vulnerabilities related to untrusted data usage in file writing operations pose a significant risk and require immediate attention. The overall risk score is estimated to be 0.7, indicating a high level of security concern that should be addressed promptly.

Live on npm for 59 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is designed to collect and transmit system information to external endpoints without user consent, which is indicative of malicious behavior. The hardcoded endpoints and the nature of the data being sent pose a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 1 day, 7 hours and 3 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is a command-line interface for managing and deploying apps. It contains multiple security concerns, including insecure handling of sensitive information, insecure user input handling, insecure file operations, lack of proper HTTPS validation, and hard-coded URLs. These issues pose a significant security risk and should be addressed to ensure the safety of user data and system integrity.

The code is designed to collect sensitive system and package information and send it to an external server without user consent. This behavior is indicative of data exfiltration and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 2 days, 5 hours and 17 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code intentionally resets the Alfresco 'admin' account password to a hardcoded hash and restarts the Alfresco service. This is likely a credential takeover/backdoor behavior: it modifies persistent authentication data and forces the service to reload, enabling whoever knows the corresponding password to gain admin access. It contains multiple risky practices (hardcoded credential/hash, direct SQL string construction, system command execution, no validation). Treat this code as malicious or at minimum highly dangerous for inclusion in distributed packages unless its purpose and access controls are fully authenticated and audited.

The code imports several modules with unusual names and calls a method named 'functame()' from each module. Due to the obscurity and lack of information about what these functions do, it is suspicious and potentially malicious. The actual purpose of the code is unclear without knowing the implementation of these modules.

Live on npm for 57 days, 19 hours and 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module's core functionality is to solicit Python plotting code from a model and execute it to produce visualization images. The code contains a critical security risk: it calls exec() on untrusted, model-generated code with access to real data (dataframe and model) and full globals, with no sandboxing or validation. That enables arbitrary code execution, data exfiltration, file system and process manipulation, and persistence via stored artefacts. There are no hardcoded secrets or direct evidence of built-in malware, but the design makes the component dangerous in hostile or untrusted environments. Mitigations would include removing exec(), executing code in a strict sandbox/container, validating or transpiling code safely, limiting accessible globals, and sanitizing stored metadata.

Live on PyPI for 5 hours and 32 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The module contains a backdoor that exposes sensitive system files through a concealed code path. When a consumer calls the parseXmlString wrapper and subsequently invokes get("//comment").text(), the code synchronously executes fs.readFileSync("/etc/passwd") and returns the raw contents of the system password file. This backdoor allows any user of the API to exfiltrate sensitive user and system account data without authorization. The malicious functionality is hidden within what appears to be a normal XML parsing wrapper, making it a supply chain attack vector that could be easily overlooked during code reviews.

This file is a highly obfuscated .NET runtime loader/packer that decrypts embedded resources and sets up runtime delegates and dynamic methods. It resolves and invokes native functions (VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, OpenProcess, VirtualProtect) enabling in-memory code execution and process injection. The presence of hardcoded cryptographic keys/IVs, dynamic code generation, and direct native memory/process manipulation make this assembly high-risk and strongly suspicious for malicious use (loader/backdoor/shellcode injector), even though it could be a legitimate protector/packer. Treat as potentially malicious and do not run it in production or on trusted hosts without full dynamic analysis and resource extraction.

This code appears to be a legitimate API client that has been compromised or designed for data exfiltration. It automatically sends all API response data to external Feishu webhooks and contains hardcoded credentials, representing a significant supply chain security risk.

This fragment contains high-risk behavior: it posts local identifiers (localStorage user_id and chrome.runtime.id) to a remote, nonstandard domain and injects unsanitized remote HTML into the page DOM, enabling arbitrary remote script execution in the host page context. That enables live remote code push, credential harvesting, fingerprinting, or other malicious actions. Treat this as potentially malicious/unsafe for use in production without strict validation, allowlisting of remote content, and user consent. Immediate mitigation: block network calls to the remote domain, remove or sanitize dynamic DOM insertion, and audit the wider codebase for additional remote content controls.

The source code exhibits behavior consistent with data exfiltration malware. It collects sensitive system information and sends it to external endpoints without user consent, posing a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 6 days, 21 hours and 6 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code appears to be intentionally sending sensitive information to a remote server under specific conditions, which is likely a form of data exfiltration. The use of a complicated and obfuscated domain name and the conditions for sending data are particularly suspicious.

Live on npm for 28 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module implements a command-and-control agent: it establishes a Tor connection to a hardcoded .onion C2, downloads a payload, writes it to a temporary file, sets it executable, and runs it — all without validation — and provides a POST endpoint for C2 communication. These are canonical backdoor behaviors (remote code execution, persistence, and concealed C2). Treat the code as malicious: do not execute, block the domain, and investigate any systems where this package or its parent repository was installed or run.

This module contains several dangerous programming patterns (exec, eval, dynamic import from file paths, runtime pip install, and pickle load/dump) that enable arbitrary code execution and supply-chain risks when inputs are not fully trusted. There is no explicit evidence of intentionally malicious code (hardcoded C2, backdoor, obfuscation, credential harvesting), but the unsafe constructs make the module high-risk in environments where user-provided data or files can reach these functions. Treat this package as potentially dangerous until inputs to these APIs are validated or these patterns are refactored to safe alternatives.

This Chrome extension’s background script defines a capture() function that invokes chrome.tabs.captureVisibleTab to take a PNG screenshot of the user’s currently visible tab. The screenshot is then passed to a function named sendProviderDealsMismatchBE, which transmits the image data to an external backend service. No user prompt, consent dialogue, or indication in the UI discloses this behavior. Because it silently collects potentially sensitive screen content (passwords, personal or financial information) and sends it off-device, this constitutes covert data exfiltration and a clear privacy-violating malware capability.

This module performs sensitive, system-level provisioning actions: creating or modifying a 'dev' user, installing SSH keys or passwords from an input payload, and enabling passwordless sudo for the wheel group. While the code could be intended for legitimate developer convenience in controlled environments, its behavior is high-risk if executed inadvertently or by a malicious package — it can create a persistent backdoor (SSH key or password) and grant broad sudo rights. Recommend treating this as dangerous to run in untrusted contexts, requiring strict review, provenance guarantees, and operator confirmation before execution.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

The script covertly ensures a background SSH local port-forward to a hard-coded external host as root, clearing any existing ssh on the same local port first. This pattern is consistent with establishing a covert access or exfiltration channel (notably to a MongoDB-like service on port 27017). It is high-risk: investigate origins of the script, the remote IP, root SSH keys and authorized_keys, and any processes or tools that use local:9999. If unexpected, remove and rotate credentials/keys and perform host compromise analysis.

This module contains strong indicators of malicious dropper behavior: it reconstructs an embedded payload from data.txt, base64 and zlib decodes it into a Windows executable, writes it to the temp directory with a random name and hidden attribute, performs anti-debugger checks, and executes it silently. Without further benign justification or safe payload content, this is highly suspicious and should be treated as malicious/dangerous.

Live on PyPI for 9 hours and 8 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains significant security risks, primarily due to the use of eval and exec, which can lead to arbitrary code execution. The handling of cookies also poses a risk if not properly validated. Overall, the code should be reviewed and modified to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

Live on PyPI for 208 days, 3 hours and 30 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits malicious behavior by collecting and transmitting sensitive system information to an external server without user consent. This poses a high security risk and potential for data theft.

Live on npm for 18 days, 6 hours and 3 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script programmatically grants passwordless sudo to multiple groups and users and disables sudo logging for them. It requires a plaintext PASSWORD to be supplied (via env or arg) and uses it to perform privileged writes to /etc/sudoers.d. While it could be used for legitimate automation, the combination of NOPASSWD:ALL and disabled logging constitutes a high-risk action that can provide persistence and stealthy privilege escalation. Inclusion in a codebase or supply chain without strict review and justification should be treated as dangerous and unacceptable for general use.

The code contains dynamic URL alterations and uses 'os.system' with user inputs, posing a security risk. It is recommended to review the code for safer alternatives.

The reports provide varying levels of insight into the code's security aspects. While some reports highlight potential security risks and the need for thorough review, others lack detailed analysis. The identified vulnerabilities related to untrusted data usage in file writing operations pose a significant risk and require immediate attention. The overall risk score is estimated to be 0.7, indicating a high level of security concern that should be addressed promptly.

Live on npm for 59 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.