Citizens enjoy arousing news. They zoom out when they are no longer aroused (
Lang et al. 2005), and they like sensationalist news
because it arouses them (
Vettehen et al. 2008). Negative news also elicits arousal (
Soroka and McAdams 2015;
Soroka et al. 2019), and is often preferred by consumers over neutral and positive news (
Trussler and Soroka 2014). Over time, the news has become increasingly negative (
Patternson 1993;
Soroka 2012) and sensationalist (
Vettehen et al. 2005), and the ability of these types of news to elicit arousal, and therefore attract an audience, might be a reason that journalists report in this manner in the first place (
Soroka and McAdams 2015). Arousal thus seems inherent to modern-day news, but research into news processing has mostly focused on the role of negative emotions and the valence dimension of affect. However, if journalists purposefully elicit arousal in news consumers to attract an audience, it is imperative to incorporate arousal in existing theories of news processing.
To test this assumption, I conducted a randomized laboratory experiment in Austria (N = 191), where participants were exposed to televised news about immigration—varying levels of threat. I employ direct physiological measures of negative valence and arousal and relate them to self-reported measures of scrutiny, policy attitudes, and behavioral intent. In doing so, I present evidence that news-induced arousal exacerbates motivated reasoning, offering a novel way to differentiate emotional responses to political news that precede cognitive biases, with important consequences for the role of journalism in democracy.
Emotions in News Processing
News media serve democracy by enabling citizens to make informed and rational decisions. However, scholars have increasingly found that, to a certain extent, citizens may be able to “believe what they want to believe because they want to believe it” (
Kunda 1990: 480). As such, partisans often continue to believe their party's stance—or even become more extreme in their beliefs—in the face of counterevidence (
Bolsen et al. 2014;
Hart and Nisbet 2012;
Leeper and Slothuus 2014;
Taber and Lodge 2006). Besides political attitudes, motivated reasoning can affect the application of stereotypes (
Kunda and Sinclair 1999), perceived public opinion (
Nir 2011), and legal decision making (
Braman and Nelson 2007). This process of motivated reasoning inevitably divides partisan groups, and is considered an important cause for political polarization (e.g.,
Lebo and Cassino 2007). As political information is primarily consumed through news media, motivated reasoning is also considered a key factor for the minimal media effects that communication scholars often face (
Cacciatore et al. 2016). Citizens are not as rational as theory presumes, but tend toward motivated reasoning when processing the news.
One explanation for motivated reasoning is that news that threatens citizens'
prior attitudes invites more scrutiny than news that bolsters them (e.g.,
Druckman and McGrath 2019;
Leeper and Slothuus 2014;
Taber and Lodge 2006). However, the current paper focuses on another prominent explanation. A number of studies have shown motivated reasoning as caused by social identification (
Kahan 2010). Social identification denotes the perceived membership in a social group, and can lead citizens to feel and act as a member of a group, rather than an individual (
Tajfel and Turner 1979). A social identity is more often relevant for those who identify with this group more strongly, but also in situations in which there are clear distinctions between the ingroup and outgroup and when these groups are (presented as) acting according to expectations or stereotypes (
Huddy 2001;
Turner et al. 1994). Social identities can cause ingroup favoritism, where citizens are motivated to favor the ingroup or derogate the outgroup to satisfy a fundamental need for self-esteem (
Abrams and Hogg 1988;
Iacoviello et al. 2017).
Sometimes called
identity-defensive cognition, the identity-as-motivation hypothesis is supported by the findings that party identification drives persuasion more strongly than ideology (
Cohen 2003), and that citizens show more support for a policy if their party explicitly supports it (
Slothuus and De Vreese 2010), or when an opposing party rejects it (
Bolsen et al. 2014). In addition, this motivation also applies to non-partisan social identities such as race (
Feldman and Huddy 2018;
Shoda et al. 2014), gender (
Boyer et al. 2020), religion (
Landrum et al. 2017), and cultural identities (
Kahan et al. 2007,
2008). Citizens are motivated to evaluate identity-threatening arguments as weaker than identity-bolstering arguments, which causes more identity-defensive policy attitudes and more negative attitudes toward outgroups.
The mechanism of motivated reasoning relies heavily on emotional responses. Cognition is not based on “cold” rationality, but stored in the mind together with emotional evaluations about it (
Abelson 1963). This “hot cognition” hypothesis states that coming across information activates the associated emotional evaluations, which influences one's emotional state (
Redlawsk 2002). Because such states develop before conscious awareness (
Marcus 2013), they preconsciously determine someone's motivation to reason in a certain direction (
Lodge and Taber 2013). Any reasoning outcomes are, in this view, post hoc rationalizations of emotional reactions, triggered by the emotional associations that are linked to any piece of information.
Accordingly, emotions are crucial for motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning is associated with implicit emotion regulation (
Westen et al. 2006), and more pronounced in citizens with a stronger need to seek out emotions (
Arceneaux and Vander Wielen 2013). Specifically, motivated reasoning seems to be related to anger (
Marcus et al. 2000,
2011): anger is correlated with motivated reasoning in response to negative candidate information (
Redlawsk et al. 2010), arguments about political policies (
Suhay and Erisen 2018), and misinformation in the news (
Weeks 2015). Similarly, a combination of anger and counterarguing best describes reactance—the state in which citizens resist persuasion (
Rains 2013). Similar to motivated reasoning, reactance is a combination of emotion and cognition. However, while motivated reasoning conceptualizes affect as preceding cognitive patterns (
Lodge and Taber 2013), reactance literature considers anger and counterarguing “intertwined to such a degree that their effects on persuasion cannot be disentangled” (
Dillard and Shen 2005: 147). In order to understand news processing, we should thus understand the emotions that underlie it.
While discrete emotions are important in news processing, they are only
part of the larger concept of emotion. In contrast,
affect denotes the preconscious, physiological experience of emotion (
Keltner and Gross 1999). Affective states precede discrete emotions, which are interpretations of such states. Conscious appraisals of emotion
can align with affective states (
Bradley et al. 2001), but this is not necessarily the case (
LeDoux and Pine 2016). In contrast to reactance (
Dillard and Shen 2005;
Rains 2013), motivated reasoning theorizes that reasoning is influenced by emotion
before conscious awareness (
Lodge and Taber 2005,
2013;
Redlawsk 2002). Studying affect in addition to discrete emotions can therefore test the theory more accurately and simultaneously rule out reactance as an alternative mechanism.
Moreover, affective states are less susceptible to problems of causality than discrete emotions. Discrete emotions require conscious processing and can be dependent on citizens' political motivations (
Brader 2006). Therefore, any correlation between discrete emotions, counterarguing and attitudes could indicate either the hypothesized mediation through emotion, or simply another
result of motivated reasoning. Because affect is a preconscious physiological experience (
Marcus 2013), affective states cannot be influenced by motivated reasoning and must precede measures of counterarguing, attitudes, and behavioral intent.
Motivated reasoning theory has incorporated the valence of affect—whether the experience of affect is positive or negative: identity-threatening news leads to negative affective states, which lead to scrutiny, identity-defensive attitudes and identity-defensive behavior (
Lodge and Taber 2013). Accordingly, politically incongruent information leads to more negative affective states (
Bakker et al. 2020). Moreover, research has shown that identity-threatening news leads to (1) worse evaluations of the strength of its arguments, (2) less support for policies that are advocated for (
Taber and Lodge 2006), and (3) more tendencies to harm outgroups (
Seate and Mastro 2017). This leads to the first two hypotheses.
H1: Political news that is more threatening to citizens' social identity causes more negative affective states.
H2: Negative affective states lead to (a) scrutiny of the news that caused them, (b) identity-defensive policy attitudes, and (c) low willingness to help related outgroups.
News, Arousal, and Motivated Reasoning
Since arousal is such an important affective response to political news, it is surprising that motivated reasoning theory has largely overlooked this dimension of affect. Moreover, a two-dimensional product of valence and arousal is a common conceptualization of affect (
Russell 1980). As depicted in
Figure 1, this
circumplex model of affect results in four quadrants, where the arousal dimension reflects how active (aroused) or inactive (sleepy) someone's affective state is. Positive and negative low arousal affective states are summarized as “relaxation” and “depression,” respectively, while high arousal affective states can be called “excitement” and “distress.”
Fundamentally, arousal could play a crucial role in motivated reasoning. Arousal should not elicit a direct effect on motivated reasoning, because it can signal either positive emotion (excitement) or negative emotion (distress) (
Russell 1980). However, in combination with negative valence, arousal can play a crucial part in the processing of news. Motivated reasoning is an active process, in which citizens employ cognitive energy to scrutinize threatening information (
Jain and Maheswaran 2000). While low-arousal negative affective states could motivate citizens to reduce this state, their low level of activation would inhibit them to spend cognitive energy. In contrast, high-arousal negative affective states provide both the motivation
and activation to scrutinize identity-threatening news, leading to the asymmetrical formation of attitudes and identity-defensive behavior.
It can therefore be expected that threatening news specifically leads to
high-arousal negative affective states, which are exactly the affective states that cause motivated reasoning. This is in line with previous findings on emotion in motivated reasoning, as anger is considered a high-arousal negative emotion (
Russell 1980). I thus expect an interaction between the valence and arousal dimensions, in which the link between negative affective states and motivated reasoning is stronger in combination with high arousal than with low arousal.
H3: Political news that is more threatening to citizens' social identity causes more high-arousal negative affective states.
H4: High-arousal negative affective states lead to (a) scrutiny of the news that caused them, (b) identity-defensive policy attitudes, and (c) less willingness to help related outgroups.
Discussion
This study set out to explore the consequences of news-induced arousal for the motivated processing of political news. Unexpectedly, the findings show that more threatening news about immigration leads to less negative affective states, among Austrian citizens. However, combining negative valence with arousal showed some initial evidence that citizens might experience low-arousal negative affective states in response to low-threat immigration news, but high-arousal negative affective states in response to threatening news. Subsequently, the results showed that, to some extent, negative valence led to counterarguing and opposition against accepting refugees, but not to less intent to help them. Again, combining valence and arousal showed that it was mostly high-arousal negative affective states that led to counterarguing, negative attitudes toward a proimmigration policy and less intent to help refugees. In contrast, low-arousal negative affective states had much smaller effects on counterarguing and policy attitudes, and even a reverse effect on the willingness to help outgroup members. These findings can contribute to media effects and motivated reasoning research in at least four ways.
Firstly, the results add a new dimension to the literature on the impact of news use in information-rich societies. Increasingly, communication scholars have shown that news consumers like and select news that is arousing (
Lang et al. 2005;
Trussler and Soroka 2014). This arousal may be grounded in negativity (
Soroka and McAdams 2015;
Soroka et al. 2019), digitalization (
Kruikemeier et al. 2018), or sensationalism (
Vettehen et al. 2008). Accordingly, the news seems to become more sensationalist (
Vettehen et al. 2005) and negative (
Patternson 1993;
Soroka 2012). The increasingly competitive news environment thus seems to encourage journalists to produce arousing news. However, the results of this study show that arousing news does not just have the potential to increase the size of a medium's audience. News-induced arousal also exacerbates motivated reasoning. Therefore, the arousal that negative and sensationalist news cause in their readers, may contribute to political polarization and societal cleavages. While citizens prefer arousing political content in the news, this type of content might not be what is best for democracy. This poses society with a crucial conundrum. What is the value of citizens using news media to inform themselves, if it only drives them towards polarization? While market pressures may encourage news media to reach larger audiences, they might also push news media to polarize and divide the electorate.
Secondly, this study shows that the valence dimension of affect might not fully describe the role of affective states in motivated reasoning. Applying a circumplex model of affect (
Russell 1980) to motivated reasoning shows that physiological arousal functions in combination with negative affect in specific ways. Importantly, this study cautiously shows initial evidence that threatening news does not just lead to more negative affect, but to more
high-arousal negative affective states. However, this study is only the first step in this direction, as not all robustness checks validate this finding and future research is needed to confirm this effect. This study also shows that high-arousal negative affective states lead to the strongest motivated reasoning effects. Since anger is considered a high-arousal negative emotion (
Russell 1980), this is in line with previous findings that show that anger is the main driver of motivated reasoning (
Marcus et al. 2011). However, this theoretical advancement has some important implications for motivated reasoning theory.
Because motivated reasoning is based on the active scrutiny of threatening information (
Lodge and Taber 2013), it makes sense that low-arousal affective states lead to less counterarguing of political information than high-arousal negative affective states. People with equivalent discrete emotions—who are sad or depressed—are better described as inactive and should be expected to ignore or zone out of threatening information instead of actively engaging with them. Arousal was even more important in the effect on the willingness to help refugees since low-arousal negative affective states led to
more willingness to help the outgroup. Possibly, participants in low-arousal negative affective states wanted to help the refugees because they felt sad for them. Indeed, the willingness to help others has long been thought to be motivated by negative-state relief too, albeit low-arousal negative affective states (
Cialdini et al. 1987). Without incorporating discrete emotions, though, this is merely speculation, and future research should investigate the interplay between affective states and discrete emotions in motivated reasoning.
Notably, low-arousal negative affective states still caused some polarizing effects by, for instance, leading to
some counterarguing and
somewhat more negative attitudes toward the immigration policy. This finding seems crucial in the current debate of whether motivated reasoning is (always) the mechanism through which threats lead to polarization. Instead, citizens might also merely take on the expected stance of their group (
Han and Federico 2018). Perhaps the arousal dimension can explain such differential cognitive mechanisms. After all, processes like self-stereotyping cost less energy than motivated reasoning. Studying the differential cognitive mechanisms caused by low-arousal and high-arousal negative affective states in political information processing would thus be a fruitful future endeavor.
Thirdly, this paper validates the causal path that is assumed in previous research about emotions in motivated reasoning. Several studies have found that anger mediates motivated reasoning effects, based on correlational evidence between self-report measures (
Redlawsk et al. 2010;
Suhay and Erisen 2018;
Weeks 2015). Such studies assume that there is a causal direction in which emotions are experienced before counterarguing, attitudes and behavior. However, the expression of emotions is subject to motivation too (
Brader 2006). The use of physiological measures in the current study shows that
preconscious experiences of emotion affect the reasoning patterns that we observe in other research. These results thus validate the causal path of studies that use self-reported measures of emotion in motivated reasoning research.
Finally, this paper shows how we can combine physiological measures to study a circumplex model of affect in motivated reasoning research. Research incorporating physiological measures in political science has usually focused on only one dimension—most commonly arousal (e.g.,
Soroka and McAdams 2015;
Soroka et al. 2019), or analyzed arousal and valence as two separate entities (e.g.,
Bakker et al. 2020). Yet, the two dimensions are inherently connected. As the results in this paper underline, both positive and negative affective states are very different in combination with low or high arousal. And, conversely, arousal has very different effects for citizens in positive or negative affective states. Modeling the two dimensions together as interaction effects allows researchers to take all four quadrants of the circumplex model of affect into account (
Russell 1980). This is important because, as my results show for motivated reasoning, adding the arousal dimension to affective states can illuminate differential effects. This study may thus inspire researchers to move beyond simplified unidimensional models and analyses of affective states when studying political information processing, leading to more nuanced results.
Yet the results in this study are not without caveats. Firstly, the results showed that threatening news leads to less negative affective states. Some might say that this finding contradicts research showing that
Corrugator Supercilii activity is caused by negative information (e.g.,
Bakker et al. 2020;
Cacioppo and Petty 1979;
Hietanen et al. 1998;
Wexler et al. 1992). The results in this study, however, suggest two explanations that are likely combined. The first is that only considering the valence dimension of affect is simply not enough. A closer examination of the data reveals that the low-threat condition elicited more
low-arousal negative affective states, but less
high-arousal negative affective states. The second explanation is that the predominantly left-wing sample in this study felt bad for the refugees in the low-threat condition because they would not get Austrian citizenship. This is supported by the finding that the difference in negative valence is driven by that part of the stimulus material. Because arousal did not increase in the low-threat condition, a combination of these explanations arguably makes most sense. The mostly left-wing sample experienced low-arousal negative affect when the news item announced that the refugees would not get citizenship. While this shows that using sensitive physiological measures in studying complex societal issues can be challenging, it also shows that incorporating a more comprehensive model of affective states can help understand citizens' emotional reactions better. Future research could use a more diverse sample to incorporate moderation by ideology.
A second challenge posed by this experiment is how to interpret these results with regard to previous findings of discrete emotions in motivated reasoning. After all, a downside of physiological measures is that it is not always evident which emotions people relate to them. The question therefore remains, as what emotion(s) are the affective states in this experiment interpreted by those experiencing them and how does this interpretation affect information processing. The theory of affective intelligence states that anger leads to motivated reasoning, while anxiety leads to information-seeking behavior (
Marcus et al. 2011). As those are both high-arousal negative affective states (
Russell 1980), the results of this experiment cannot distinguish between these emotions. Yet, anger and anxiety also often exist simultaneously, and can have similar effects on immigration attitudes as well (
Brader et al. 2008). The goal of the current experiment, though, was not to differentiate discrete emotions but to address the physiological process preceding them. As mentioned before, it would be fruitful for future research to investigate the interplay between affect and discrete emotions in motivated reasoning.
Thirdly, the manipulation check in this experiment measured whether participants noticed the number of immigrants in the news item. However, it did not explicitly measure the experienced social identity threat. Therefore, it is assumed that larger groups of immigrants cause more social identity threat. According to previous literature, this is a safe assumption. Salient immigrant groups cause perceived group competition for resources which causes opposition to immigration (
Esses et al. 2001), and the perceived threat of immigration is even stronger for dissimilar immigrant groups than for similar immigrant groups (
Brader et al. 2008). However, it remains unsure which social identity is threatened exactly. Immigration can threaten ethnic/racial identity (
Wright et al. 2012), religious identity (
Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2015), and national identity (
Mangum and Block 2018). Even though these identities often overlap, it is important to note that we cannot distinguish between them in the current study.
Finally, the finding that the high-threat condition led to more high-arousal negative affective states should be interpreted with caution. As there is considerable autocorrelation in the physiological measures, the error terms of the regression coefficients might be biased. Even though the direction should be valid, this is only initial evidence that threatening political information leads to high-arousal negative affective states. In order to further confirm this finding, future research should use more diverse samples and compare different kinds of threats (e.g., real and symbolic social identity threats).
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this paper indicates that news-induced arousal exacerbates motivated reasoning effects. This is in line with theories of “hot cognition” (
Redlawsk 2002) and motivated reasoning (
Kunda 1990;
Lodge and Taber 2013), and could be uncovered by combining physiological measures of negative affect and arousal in a circumplex model of affect (
Russell 1980). Even though this study was only conducted in Austria, motivated reasoning has been shown in a multitude of countries and contexts. These findings therefore improve our understanding of the role of emotion in news processing, as well as our understanding of the consequences of sensationalist and negative news for democracy.