πλήρης τίτλος:
Haris Vlavianos, Greece, 1941–49: From Resistance to Civil War. The Strategy of the
Greek Communist Party, Macmillan-St Antony’s College, Oxford 1992
===
Contents
Acknowledgements
List of Acronyms ix
Note on Transliteration
Chronological Table
Introduction
I The Greek Communist Party: Resistance or Revolution?
II Varkiza: Capitulation to the British?
III
From Varkiza to the Seventh Congress
IV
The Elections of March 1946: Pandora’s Box
V The Second Plenum: Textbook Revolution
VI The Decision to Abstain: ‘Tactical Error’ or ‘Decisive Mistake’?
VII From Limited Self-Defence to Civil War
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
===
Introduction
This book is a study of the
policies and strategies of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) during the period
1941-7, with particular emphasis on the period 1945-7. It examines the policy
of the KKE during the Resistance and the immediate post-liberation period with
the purpose of offering a post-revisionist interpretation of the causes of the
Greek Civil War. In what follows we have tried to deconstruct a number of
right-wing orthodox and left-wing revisionist myths and polemics attempting to
offer an account of events that remains as far as possible detached. Naturally,
we do not wish to pretend that this study is free of value judgments. A study
of this kind that did not derive from moral and political premises of some kind
would be impossible, and if it were possible, it would be sterile. What is
important in an academic inquiry into politics and the nature and
manifestations of power is not to exclude value judgments, but to subject these
judgments to thorough investigation and criticism, to treat the moral issues
that arise as an integral part of the inquiry.
Unfortunately most accounts
of the Greek Civil War offer oversimplified analyses, based either on a
mechanical application of some political or sociological theory or on a series
of a priori value judgments, whose sole purpose is to condemn or exonerate the
policy of the British or the Soviets towards Greece or the policy of one of the
Greek political parties. Moreover, in their search for some useful overall
‘alibi’ that would explain or justify the actions of the Greek political
leaders or parties, these accounts ascribe primary responsibility for
developments in Greece to the ‘foreign’ factor, thus turning Greece into a
stage of helpless puppets whose strings are moved by alien hands. Although this
kind of historiography can be very comforting for the leaders and parties
concerned, not to mention the historian himself, it deflects scholarly
attention away from the complex nature of the conflict. The causes of the
Greek Civil War can and should be explained on the basis of power relations
within Greece itself. What is required is an analysis of their historical
formation, of the source of their strength or fragility, and of the conditions
that transformed some or abolished others. In other words, we need to 11·verse our priorities and begin our inquiry with an
examination of the evolution of the social and political structures in Greece
itself. The play of forces in any particular historical situation is made possible
by the space which defines them. Foreign intervention must be understood in
terms that reject any notion that it is unilaterally imposed from outside.
The book is divided into
seven chapters. In four of them (I, III, IV, VII)
the narrative is linear and straightforward. Chapter I examines the policies of
the KKE during the inter-war and war period, and considers the reasons for the
dramatic rise in communist strength during the Occupation, given the almost
total disintegration of the Party during the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936-40.
The significance of Zachariadis’ famous ‘letters’ to the Greek people at the
time of the Greco-Italian war of 1940 is analyzed and the character and aims of
the most powerful resistance movement EAM/ELAS are assessed. This chapter also
examines the policies of the British government towards EAM/ELAS and the
various other resistance organizations, and the extent of Soviet involvement in
Greece during this period. It attempts to refute the right-wing assertion that
the ‘second round’ of the civil war (the clash between EAM/ELAS and the British
in Athens in December 1944) was the result of a well-planned attempt by the
communists to seize power by force, as well as the left-wing view that the
communists were provoked into hostilities by the British so that they could be
destroyed. Moreover, it dismisses the cold-war orthodox belief that Stalin
fomented civil war in Greece and that the Greek communists acted as his agents.
The December Events of 1944
came to an end with the signing at Varkiza of a political agreement that was
supposed to form the basis for the peaceful reconciliation of the opposing
factions within the country and for the restoration of democratic legality.
Instead Varkiza became, in the hands of the government, an instrument of revenge,
the curtain-raiser to the ‘third round’ of the civil war. Chapter III examines
the reasons for the failure of the Varkiza Agreement and assesses the
responsibility of the various British- sponsored Greek governments for this
development. It traces the evolution of the Left during a period of mounting
right-wing violence and outlines the gradual change in the objectives of the
KKE. It dismisses the orthodox view that in the immediate post-Varkiza period
the communists were regrouping and preparing for the ‘third round’, and sees
the abandonment by the KKE of the parliamentary alternative as the direct
result of the government’s failure to enforce the provisions of the Varkiza
Agreement.
Chapter IV examines in
detail the issue of the parliamentary elections of March 1946 and the manner in
which they were organized and conducted. It is now generally accepted that
these elections constituted the last chance for a peaceful post-war evolution
in Greece. The decision of the Left to abstain from these elections served as
the catalyst for civil war. Although the reasons and the implications of this
abstention are discussed in Chapter VI, this chapter assesses the
responsibilities of the Greek, British, American and Soviet governments in this
affair. It also considers the way in which the ‘Greek Question’ became
internationalized in the United Nations and the consequences of this
development for Greece itself. Finally, it analyses the circumstances
surrounding the international observation of these elections and their actual
results.
Chapter VII examines the
policies pursued by the KKE in the period between the elections and the
outbreak of the ‘third round’ of the civil war in 1947. Based mostly on primary
sources and recently declassified KKE official documents, this chapter explores
the gradual intensification of the conflict and outlines the objectives, dilemmas
and errors of the Party leadership. In addition, it attempts to define the
extent of the involvement of the neighbouring communist states in the civil war
and their share of responsibility for the defeat of the KKE.
The three remaining chapters
(II, V, VI) examine in greater depth and detail three questions that became
major issues of controversy within the KKE after the end of the civil war: the
question of whether the decision of the wartime leadership of the KKE to sign
the Varkiza Agreement constituted an act of unconditional surrender, as opposed
lo a realistic compromise; the question of whether at the Second Plenum of
February 1946 the KKE decided to launch an armed rising; and finally, the
question of whether the KKE’s decision to boycott the parliamentary elections
of March 1946 was a decisive mistake that led the Party to its ultimate defeat.
In attempting to answer these questions we rely heavily on documents published
after the end of the civil war, especially on the minutes of the Sixth and
Seventh Plenums of 1956 and 1957, when the KKE, as a result of the decisions of
the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, went through the process of de-stalinization,
and the old leadership, including Zachariadis himself, the KKE’s General
Secretary, was expelled from the Party. A proper evaluation of the policies of
the KKE during the period of the civil war is impossible without reference to
this valuable material. So although these chapters seem at first sight to
disrupt the overall pattern, their inclusion is intended to elucidate various
confllicting issues that arise in our inquiry.
In this book there is little
discussion of Greece’s economic development in the post-liberation period.
What characterizes economic development in the period between Varkiza and the
breaking out of civil war in late 1946 is the virtual non-existence of an
economic policy. All governments of this period relied on foreign resources,
first on the assistance of the British, and especially UNRRA (United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration), and later on the Americans, to
tackle the mounting economic problems (galloping inflation, scarcity of essential
commodities and huge budget deficities). Their attitude was one of laissez-faire,
with their attention geared towards consolidating their power and ensuring that
their political hegemony remained unchallenged. Yet the substantial amount of
aid which flowed into Greece did not bring about the stabilization of the
economy. The reestablishment of government authority in the economic sphere and
the enforcement of a national programme of reconstruction and development
required above all the unqualified support of all segments of society and the
cooperation of all political forces, especially that of the Left, whose
influence in labour unions, consumer and agricultural cooperatives, and other
types of mass organizations was widespread. Had it been possible to enlist the
support of the Left, the legitimacy of the government’s plans would have been
greatly enhanced and its efforts to implement a stabilization programme
greatly assisted. As things stood, however, government choices veered to the
reverse course. At the political level the basic aim was to banish left-wing
influence and impose control by unrepresentative factions, whose main
credential was anti-communism. The general disarray that prevailed within the
labour movement throughout this period was not conducive to any sort of genuine
political participation by labour in the process of reconstruction. It was not
even conducive to the more limited objective of stabilization, despite the
intensification of police methods and even the legislated prohibition of
strikes during the latter years of the Civil War.
Another important
implication of the collision course between the government and the Left was the
allocation of larger and larger amounts of funds for military and public
security purposes. The need to maintain what the government and the British
perceived as ‘public order’ undermined what possibility remained of
establishing financial order in state affairs. The military expenditure was not
only enormous. It was also beyond normal financial control. It remained
insulated from the budgetary control process and functioned as an independent
compartment of the fiscal activity of the state, at the expense of making the
economic crisis in the civilian sector worse.
Having excluded the Left
from any meaningful dialogue, the only powerful constituency which the
government could look to as political allies were the merchants and
industrialists. Any attempt to stabilize the economy would have required the
taxing of their profits and extensive price controls. Naturally, both groups
ensured that such policies, whenever applied, would fail. Fortunately for them
and for the Greek government, when in February 1947 Britain, realizing that it
could no longer afford to keep the Greek economy running, decided to pull out
of Greece, the Americans were ready to assume the burden.
We should point out right
from the start that an assessment of the policy of the KKE during the period of
the civil war is a difficult and complicated exercise. First, Zachariadis’
statements during the years following the end of the civil war and his
testimonies to various KKE members read very much like an apologia, an attempt
by him to defend his policy during the civil war. They therefore have to be
read with great caution.
Secondly, the various
accounts of old KKE members are in most cases heavily prejudiced. Some members,
especially those whose fortunes were closely linked to Zachariadis, simply try
to provide alibis for past errors. Others, while trying to take a more critical
view of the past, often find it difficult to confess openly to the mistakes of
the Party. In this respect, the split in the KKE since 1968 has further
complicated the picture, given that the Party line during the civil war is a
major issue of contention between the two communist parties, the
Moscow-oriented one, and the Eurocommunist one. Some accounts, therefore,
represent simply an effort by their authors to openly discredit those of
others, because the latter belong to the ‘other’ Communist Party. Writing a book
on the subject or publishing memoirs seems a good way of settling old scores.
Finally, although during the
period between the end of the civil war and Zachariadis’ dethronement in 1956
no KKE member could freely express his opinion about the reasons that led to
the defeat of the Party, the same applies for the period following his fall.
The temptation to satisfy the Soviet interpretation of events was too great for
anyone to ignore.
The common thread running
through the literature on the KKE is a distaste for taking the history of Greek
Communism on terms other than those it has itself imposed. In this study we
have tried to avoid a historical perspective that seeks to totalize history and
offers the reassurance of an end towards which history moves. Moreover, we do
not pretend, as some historians do, to base our conclusions on an ‘apocalyptic’
or scientific objectivity. In our reading of the various sources, whenever we
have encountered the words truth, justice or freedom we have looked for strategies
of domination. We see the world not as a play which simply masks a truer
reality that exists behind the scene, but as it appears.
The history of the Greek
Civil War, as we have interpreted it in this book, is the history of errors, of
petty malice, of vicious intentions, of high-sounding objectives sometimes
masking the lowest of motives. It is not, however, a history of genuine
villains but of men moved by ambitions and greed, beset by fears and
suspicions, struggling to decipher a network of relations, constantly in
motion and tension, pretending to see the light when groping about in the dark.
Such a history, however, is not devoid of nobility, as it concerns men who
sacrificed their lives for their convictions believing that they were doing so
for the sake of an absolute truth. Their tragedy is that they were wrong; ours,
that we condemn their actions thinking that we can thereby rewrite the past.
Perhaps our catharsis lies in our weakness to deny this past, in the knowledge
that their history is ultimately our history.
