by JOHN
LOUIS HONDROS
A British
Political Intelligence Paper (Middle East) of 18 June 1944 begins, "In
this Paper the word 'quisling' is applied to those who have collaborated with
the Germans but it does not necessarily imply pro-German sentiments. The term
'Quisling forces' is used for all those bodies who accepted arms from the
Germans for use in the field against other Greeks."[1]
This peculiar consideration of Greek collaborationists temmed from the Foreign
Office's committment to the restoration of King George II and his
government-in-exile. Prime Minister Churchill and the top officials of the
Foreign Office were convinced that this restoration offered the only means of
establishing a stable and friendly Greek government in Athens which would help secure
Britain's postwar geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean[2].
By 1943 the
Greek Communist Party's (KKE) The National Liberation Front (EAM) and its
National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) presented a formidable obstacle to the
success of British policy. As
Colonel T. Thornton, the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence succinctly
noted on 18 May 1943: "Our aim in Greece is to prepare an efficient force
ready to co-operate with us in the re-occupation of the country and the
installment of a stable government. E.A.M. cannot be relied on to give us such co-operation."[3]
[…]
[1] Public Record
Office (PRO) War Office (WO) 208/713, Political Intelligence Paper No. 55,
Greek Security Battalions, 18 June 1944.
[2] Prokopis
Papastratis, British Policy Toward Greece During the Second World War
(London, 1984), pp. 217-218; John C. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party (London,
1982), p. 75.
[3] PRO, WO
208/698A, Reports on the Greek Resistance February-May 1943, Thornton minutes
(prepared for the Director of Military Intelligence), 18 May 1943.
