Peter
Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek
Communism, 1944-1949, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1989
===
Contents
Preface
Abbreviations
Transliteration and Documentation
Map
1.
Introduction: The Greek Civil War and Soviet Foreign
Policy
2.
Consolidating Wartime Gains, 1944-1945
3. Postwar Soviet Objectives and Greek Communist
Gradualism, 1945-1946
4. From Dualism to Defeat, 1946-1949: The Soviet
Impact on the Third Round of the Civil War
5.
Elite Conflict and Soviet Policy in Greece
6. The Impact of Soviet Policy on Postwar Balkan
Politics
Appendix: Historical Narrative and Path Analysis
Bibliography
Index
===
Preface
Few postwar events have had as profound an effect on Western perceptions
of Soviet international behavior as the Greek Civil War. The political
instability and Communist insurgency in Greece, coinciding with Soviet pressure
on the fragile Turkish and Iranian governments, convinced the West it was
confronted by an ideologically militant Soviet Union pursuing a policy of
global revolutionary expansionism. With the Truman Doctrine, the United States
served notice that Greece was to be America’s first test of a policy of
containment of Soviet expansionism. Although victory in the Greek Civil War was
important to the United States at the time, the conflict’s long-term importance
lies in the American Inceptions it created about the means and motives of
Soviet foreign policy. More than four decades later, that legacy of the Greek
Civil War continues to affect U.S. calculations of Soviet behavior.
Greece’s strategic location and the occurrence of civil war there during
a historic transformation of the international system naturally assured the
examination of the Communist insurgency. What is surprising is the extent to
which assumptions about Soviet conduct in the Balkans have remained unexamined.
No investigation has ever determined actual Soviet involvement in
Greece; no persuasive explanation of Soviet policy during the years 1944-49 has
ever emerged. In this book, using a variety of sources (Greek Communist, in
particular), I have tried to determine as precisely as possible the extent and
impact of .Soviet activity in Greece. Beyond this, I have integrated the
historical evidence into an interpretation that, without sacrifice of
complexity, adequately explains Soviet policy. The result, I hope, provides the
basis for a more careful evaluation of Soviet conduct in the first years of the
Cold War.
The study of the Greek Civil War, because it draws in virtually every
factor important in the explanation of Soviet foreign policy generally, can
illuminate the extent to which the Soviet Union was driven by ideological
rather than pragmatic considerations; Soviet willingness to pursue objectives
within the existing state system; the relative importance to the Soviets of
subordinating all Communist parties to the Soviet state; and the extent to
which Stalin would risk Soviet gains to take advantage of an adversary’s
weakness. Case-study limitations aside, studying the Greek Civil War also makes
it possible to test assumptions about Soviet conduct because the war coincided
with the evolution of a new strategic relationship among the major powers in
the international system. Postwar Stalinist foreign policy derived part of its
character and style from this crucial episode; for those early postwar events
established the limits and patterns of foreign policy that have affected
succeeding generations of Soviet leaders down to the present.
The scarcity of information on Soviet behavior always tests the
creativity of scholars. My extensive use of Greek Communist, British, and
American sources means my analysis is based largely on perceptions of
Soviet conduct rather than on the conduct itself. No analysis of foreign policy
is ever, of course, free of perceptual problems. Perhaps mine is not the sole
defensible interpretation of events in postwar Greece; the information I have
used may yield alternative ones. Mine is shaped by my focus on the Soviet
contribution to developments in postwar Greece; I hope its coherence and scope
enables it to stand up to comparison with the alternatives.
As in all historical research, the validity of some information, as well
as the meaning of certain documents, is open to question; some documents
reflect opinions, rather than the facts; and there is the possibility of deliberate
falsehoods. Yet, converging lines of evidence from a variety of sources do
allow for an intersubjective evaluation of the data. Where possible, I have
treated information that appears in both Western and Greek Communist archives
as possessing higher-order validity than data found in only one of these
sources. Furthermore, whatever doubts there may be about the validity of
Communist sources, the Greek Communists were in much closer contact with the
Soviets than Western officials were. And there is simply no other currently
available source of information on the Soviet role in the Greek Civil War.
I cannot begin here to acknowledge all those who have contributed to
this book or describe the ways my life has been enriched in the process. I
trust that all will understand that it is not from ingratitude that I restrict
myself to the major contributors. I owe a special debt to John Armstrong for
the time he has taken to comment upon early drafts. Because he was my major
adviser, his understanding and encouragement were important to me; his
straightforward manner, honesty, and devotion to serious scholarship have been
my model. I am grateful to my undergraduate adviser, Yaroslav Bilinsky, because
his courses sparked my interest in Soviet politics. Patrick Riley has always
inspired my intellectual endeavors; through his example, I have come to appreciate
the pursuit of knowledge for its intrinsic rewards. I also thank Michael
Petrovich and Melvin Croan for providing useful comments and criticisms early
in my project.
John Iatrides and Ole Smith encouraged and supported my work in its
initial phases and then took the time to read a draft of the completed
manuscript. Ivo Banac reviewed a later version. Their comments were especially
valuable in the long task of revision; I hope that I have done justice to their
criticisms and observations. Prokopis Papastratis generously assisted me while
I was doing my research in Greece. The kindness and patience of those who
helped me remain a source of great satisfaction.
Of course no project of this kind is possible without financial assistance.
The Russian Area Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
generously awarded me three Title VI Foreign Language and Area Studies
Fellowships, which permitted me to carry out research in Greece and to write up
the findings on my return. In addition, the University of Wisconsin Graduate
School provided me with foreign and domestic travel grants to complete basic
research at the Public Records Office in London and at the National Archives in
Washington, D.C. I was also fortunate to receive assistance in order to carry
out the supplementary research essential for revision. A research grant
provided by the American Philosophical Society and the University of Vermont’s
Summer Research Fellowship made possible my return to Greece and Britain to
acquire further materials. Terry Walsh of the University of London kindly provided
housing for me and my wife, making our stay in Britain as pleasant as it was
productive. Finally, John Iatrides, Nikiforos Diamandouros, Nicholas
Rizopoulos, and Lars Baerentzen were kind enough to invite me to a conference
on the Greek Civil War, sponsored by the Lehrman Institute, where I received
valuable comments on my work, along with intellectual stimulation.
Perhaps the greatest benefit, however, has been the personal support of
those close to me and the new friendships I formed in my travels. These alone were
worth the effort. My “family in Greece” was a source of great support to me.
Dimitris and Aliki Georgalas, Elly Triandafillidou, and Olga Miltiadovna went
out of their way to make my stay in Greece as pleasant as possible. I was also
fortunate to have the generous hospitality of Julie My Iona, Christina
Antzoulatou, and Dionysios and Paraskevoula Antzoulatou. Finally, my travels
while researching this book provided my happiest experience, meeting Regina
Romanos, who later became my wife. Regina’s subsequent patience and endurance
were vital to my own success, since intellectual investigation takes its toll
on more than just one person. I am grateful that she put up with me through
such trying times.
Of course, not even the first few steps would have been possible without
the moral and financial support of my parents, Peter and Helen Stavrakis.
Because they value a good education, I have been able to receive one. In a
sense, my work is an extension of their lives; for having survived the excesses
of Stalinism, as displaced persons in Greece after the war they were plunged
into four more years of chaos and bloodshed. They never had the chance (or the
desire) to go back over that painful terrain in order to examine the larger
forces that dominated their lives during those years; that is something I hope
my study achieves to some small degree.
Peter
J. Stavrakis
Burlington, Vermont
