πλήρης τίτλος:
Charles
Shrader, The
Withered Vine. Logistics and the Communist Insurgency in Greece, 1945-1949, Praeger, Westport Connecticut
– London 1999
===
Contents
Illustrations
Note on
Translation, Acronyms, and Measurements
Preface
Chronology:
Greece, 1939–1949
Chapter 1:
Setting the Stage
Chapter 2: The
Greek Resistance Movement, 1941–1945
Chapter 3:
Internal Conflict in the Greek Communist Party, 1945–1949
Chapter 4: The
Development of the Greek Democratic Army
Chapter 5: The
Greek Democratic Army: Manpower and Logistics
Chapter 6: The
Greek Democratic Army: External Support
Chapter 7: The
Greek Democratic Army: Strategy, Tactics, and Operations
Chapter 8:
Logistics and the Failure of the Insurrection in Greece
Appendices
Appendix A:
Greek Democratic Army Order of Battle
Appendix B:
Organizational Diagrams—GDA Units
Appendix C:
Common Map Symbols
Contents
Glossary
Selected
Bibliography
Index
===
Preface
After fifty
years, the causes, course, and outcome of the Greek civil war of 1945–1949
remain clouded by ideological and nationalist cant, Cold War mythology, and the
lack of definitive information on even the most basic details.
The assumption
remains strongly entrenched that the attempt of the Greek Communist Party (KKE)
and its allies to overthrow a weak and unstable constitutional monarchy—still
reeling from the awful effects of thirty years of war, foreign occupation,
internal political strife, economic devastation, and social upheaval—was
directed and supported from Moscow as part of a coordinated Soviet plot to
topple democratic nations unhinged by the Second World War.
Many of the
pertinent questions remain unanswered—or even unasked—and no aspect of the
Greek civil war is less well understood than the logistical arrangements of the
Communist rebels. How were the rebel forces organized? What were their
logistical requirements? What were the sources of logistical support for the
rebel forces? What types and quantities of materiel and other support were provided?
How was that support organized and delivered? What impact did the logistical
situation of the rebels have on the ultimate outcome of the rebellion?
Those questions
are addressed in this study through an examination of the logistical
requirements, organization, methods, and operations of the Greek Democratic
Army (GDA) during the so-called “Third Round” of the Greek civil war, from
February 1945 to August 1949. Although due attention is given to such
logistical functions as the determination of supply requirements, the
acquisition, storage, issue, maintenance, and disposal of equipment and
supplies, and the provision of medical services, this study focuses primarily
on the support provided to the Greek Communist guerrillas by the Soviet Union
and its satellites, in particular Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The focus
is essentially organizational and to a certain extent political and diplomatic.
Thus, internal bureaucratic issues, Greek and international political
developments, and the xiv Preface movement of men and materiel across the borders of Greece receive
detailed consideration, while some aspects of operational logistics, such as
the details of logistical support for specific guerrilla operations, receive
less attention.
This study is
based primarily on such declassified, translated records of the Greek national
government, the Communist Party of Greece, the Greek Democratic Army, and other
participants as have been reported or reproduced by contemporary Western
military and civilian observers and intelligence agencies, particularly the
U.S. military attache´s in Athens; the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and
Planning Group–Greece; and the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2,
Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army. Secondary works in the
common Western languages (other than Greek) by Greek and other Western scholars
have also been used. For the most part, access to such GDA and other Communist
documentation as may have survived remains difficult, if not impossible, and
access to the Greek national archives is similarly restricted, in large part
due to their lack of organization. The somewhat one-sided nature of the sources
thus requires that the results must be used with some caution.
The story of
the logistical support of the Communist insurgents in Greece is interesting and
significant in the broader context of post–World War II nationalist insurgencies.
In the first place, the Communist insurgents in Greece shared with their
counterparts in Indochina and Algeria a dependence on logistical support
supplied by friendly neighboring states. Although able to generate significant resources
internally, the Viet Minh in Indochina depended heavily on the arms, other
supplies, and havens provided by the People’s Republic of China.
The Algerian
rebels, unable to gather any substantial materiel resources within Algeria,
were almost entirely dependent on the generosity of their Arab backers and on
purchases abroad, funneled through two friendly neighboring states, Morocco and
Tunisia. The Greek rebels, unable to find or produce significant military resources
internally, had to rely almost entirely on the logistical support by Albania,
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.
The Greek
Communist revolt also provides an interesting case study of the impact of
ideology on such military matters as strategy, tactics, organization, and
logistics. In this respect, too, the Greek insurgency shares certain key
decision points with the post–World War II nationalist revolts in Indochina and
Algeria. Chief among those critical decisions is the selection of the optimum point
at which a guerrilla war should transition to a conventional war in order to
bring about the decisive defeat of the entrenched opponent. In all three cases,
the decision to switch to conventional organization and tactics was ill timed
or otherwise counterproductive. The Viet Minh were able to avoid serious
consequences and go on to final victory only by quickly reverting to guerrilla
warfare until they were in a better position to oppose the French by
conventional means.
In Algeria, the
nationalist rebels created conventional forces but kept the bulk of them
outside the borders of Algeria, except for the “Battle of the Barrages,” in
which they were decisively defeated. In any event, the conventional forces of
the Algerian rebels played no important role in their ultimate success, which Preface xv was achieved by political means
despite significant military setbacks. Only in the case of the Greek revolt did
a faulty assessment of when to proceed to conventional operations have a
decisive, negative result, and what translated the fateful decision into
disaster was not so much the resulting organization, strategy, or tactics as
the insupportable logistical burdens that the decision imposed.
The study of
the Greek civil war of 1945–1949 thus provides important insights to the
problem of externally supported nationalist insurgencies so prevalent since the
end of World War II. The following examination of the Greek case seeks to answer
the key questions regarding only one particular aspect of the problem—logistics.
Although no brief study focused on a single factor can bring full enlightenment
on such a complex subject as the causes, course, and outcomes of insurgency, I
hope that this study may contribute in some small way to a better understanding
of the basic details and to the dissipation of cant, myth, and ignorance.
The late
Sterling Hart played a prominent role in the initiation of this study and
helped in many ways to improve it. Its faults are mine, but Sterling made them
fewer. I am grateful also to the staff of the U.S. Army Military History Institute
at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, particularly Mr. John Slonaker, Mr. Dennis
Vetock, and Mrs. Louise Arnold-Friend, who were most helpful in pointing out
and locating interesting and pertinent materials. My wife Carole was, as always,
patient and supportive. She merits a medal, or at least a certificate of endurance.
