John Iatrides - Linda Wrigley
(ed.), Greece at the crossroads. The Civil War and its legacy, Pennsylvania
State University Press, University Park, USA 1995
===
Contents
Terms
and Abbreviations
1.
Greece
at the Crossroads, 1944-1950 John O. Iatrides
2.
The
1940s Between Past and Future George Th. Mavrogordatos
3.
The
National Liberation Front (EAM), 1941-1947: A Reassessment Hagen
Fleischer
4.
Communist
Perceptions, Strategy, and Tactics, 1945-1949 Ole L. Smith
5.
The
Changing Structure of the Right, 1945-1950 David H.
Close
6.
The
Executive in the Post-Liberation Period, 1944-1949 Nicos C.
Alivizatos
7.
Stabilization,
Development, and Government Economic Authority in the 1940s Stavros B.
Thomadakis
8.
Soviet Policy in Areas of Limited Control: The
Case of Greece, 1944-1949 Peter ]. Stavrakis
9.
The Tito-Stalin Split and the Greek Civil War Ivo Banac
10.
The
Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conflict in Greece, 1943-1949 Evangelos
Kofos
Greece,
1939-1952: A Chronology of Political Events
Contributors
Index
===
The end of the cold war and the cooling of ideological
passions make possible a more detached and balanced examination of the major
episodes of the East-West conflict. At the same time, the increased availability
of source materials, both government and private, reveals a more complex
reality than earlier interpretations described, particularly with respect to
the role of the two superpowers, which in certain of these episodes was less
decisive than previously thought.
One such episode is the Greek civil war, a critical
turning point in the history of that nation and, according to some historians,
in the shaping of America’s containment policy. The study of the Greek civil
war is important, therefore, to our understanding not only of the contemporaneous
and subsequent developments in that country but also of the dynamics of Balkan
forces and the intricacies of American and Soviet perceptions and tactics in
the early days of the East-West confrontation.
For Greece, the end of the Second World War brought to
the surface new and dynamic social forces and unveiled a national schism of
unprecedented ferocity. The deeper roots of this state of affairs can be
traced to the bankruptcy of the interwar political institutions that had
spawned the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas in August 1936. When the dictator
suddenly died in January 1941, and the country in short order suffered complete
military defeat at the hands of the German invaders and occupation by the Axis
forces a few months later, the regime’s collapse not only created a power void
but set in motion the struggle for a new, postwar political order and
legitimacy whose outcome was bound to determine the country’s longer-term
future. The simmering crisis was greatly aggravated by the paralysis imposed
upon the Greek polity by the harsh enemy occupation, many instances of
collaborationism, and by the highly politicized resistance movements that
mobilized, indoctrinated, and armed large numbers of followers propounding
radical views.
In the fall of 1944, at the moment of liberation from
the German occupiers, Greece stood “at the crossroads” and in need of a new
constitutional and social order. At least in principle, the political paths
open before the populace ranged across the entire ideological compass: from a
dictatorship of the Left or the Right to a moderate socialist, progressive
democratic, or rigidly conservative regime; from a republican to a monarchist
form of government. The final choice could have been made on the basis of a
passionate but peaceful electoral contest to determine the nation’s will. But
the factions that vied for influence over the state promoted their particular
agendas with a vehemence, exclusiveness, and mistrust that destroyed any chance
for genuine compromise and reconciliation. Before long the political tug of
war turned into full-scale civil war.
Moreover, the contest for legitimacy and control over
the nation’s future could not be waged on a purely Greek stage. As in other
periods of its development, Greece was buffeted by powerful external forces
that sought to harness the feuding factions, as well as the Greek state itself,
to their own particular interests. In turn, in their desperate effort to defeat
their domestic foes, Greek leaders eagerly solicited foreign assistance,
guidance, and patronage. In the end, the indigenous struggle for power became
enmeshed not only in age-old Balkan feuds—which have re-ignited with renewed
ferocity today—but also came to be viewed as a major battleground of the cold
war, pitting the British and the Americans against the Soviet-dominated
Communist-bloc countries to the north of Greece. External factors thus exerted
considerable influence over the course and final outcome of the Greek civil war
and had much to do with the political path Greece was to follow beyond the
decade of the 1940s.
The chapters in this volume represent a systematic
attempt to examine the domestic and external forces that were actively involved
in the Greek crisis of the late 1940s. Specifically, they consider the
political options available to postwar Greece by identifying the principal
actors promoting such options and analyzing their programs and tactics, their
strengths and weaknesses. These chapters also highlight the close interaction
between domestic, regional, and global levels of conflict as they relate to the
political development of Greece. It should be noted that because the
involvement of Britain and the United States in Greek affairs during the 1940s
has been the subject of a large number of previous studies, mostly in English,
a detailed analysis of the development of British and American policy toward
Greece is not attempted here.
The chapters in this book originated as papers
presented at n confer ence held at the Vilvorde Conference Center in
Copenhagen, Denmark, June 3-5, 1987, and most were subsequently extensively
revised. The conference was organized under the aegis of the Lehrman Institute
in New York City. Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, then the Institute’s executive
director, not only conceived of the conference but worked tirelessly to secure
the necessary funding both for the conference itself and subsequently for the
publication of these essays. The editors are also indebted to him for his
invaluable editorial advice and his unflagging interest in this project.
The conference in Copenhagen was funded in part by
grants from the Smith Richardson Foundation and the Lynde and Harry Bradley
Foundation, and by generous contributions from John D. Soutter and Daniel
Yergin. Lars Baerentzen contributed enormously to the success of the
conference, handling the arrangements in Copenhagen with efficiency and good
cheer. Finally, the publication of this volume was made possible by an
additional grant from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and by a second
contribution from Daniel Yergin. The editors speak for all the conference
participants and writers represented in this volume when they express their
heartfelt thanks to those whose contributions made this project possible.


