by Andre Gerolymatos
When, in the
spring of 1943, Ioannis Rallis agreed to form a government, an important
precondition was that his regime would be permitted the establishment of a
security force. The Germans agreed to this principle, and on April 7, 1943, the
Rallis government enacted legislation which decreed the mobilization of four
Evzone Battalions. Two of these units were to be formed in Athens and the
remainder in Thessaloniki[1].
The Germans, however, did have certain misgivings concerning the reliability of
these forces, and they consequently vetoed the deployment of any battalion in
Thessaloniki. At the same time, they only permitted the authorized battalions
to be armed with rifles and machine guns.[2]
In part, these restrictions were the
result of German apprehensions over the dubious loyalty of indigenous security
forces, as well as the effect on their Italian allies. Until this point, Greece
had fallen mostly under the Italian sphere of influence. As such, the existence
of a Greek military force could have spawned potential difficulties among the
axis partners.[3] In view of
these factors, Rallis had to contend with a token force, which, despite a
persistent recruiting campaign, failed to attract a sufficient number of volunteers.[4]
This, however, only reflected the realities of the moment since within a short
span of time the pace of the war would create an entirely different situation.[5]
[…]
Ολόκληρο το άρθρο εδώ
[1] NARS 226:83476.
According to S. Grigoriadis, Συνοπτική ιστορία της εθνικής αντίστασης, 1941-45,
Athens, 1981, p. 238, the Rallis government informed the Greek public of the
security battalions on June 29, 1945.
[2] NARS 226:83476.
In addition to the security battalions, which were, at least in name, a
military force of the Rallis government, the Germans were able to use the
services of private anticommunist organizations such as E.E.E. and the Poulos battalion.
[3]For the place
of Greece in the Italian sphere of influence, see: M.L. Van Creveld, Hitler's
Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue, Cambridge, 1973, p. 179; E. Wiskemann,
The Rome-Berlin Axis: A History of the Relations Between Hitler and
Mussolini, London, 1949, p. 278. According to F. W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship, London,
1962, p. 253, the Germans feared that their Balkan satellites would defect to
the allied camp in case of an allied offensive in the Balkans and that such an
exodus might include the Italians. This made the German attitude toward Greece,
in the spring of 1943, even more sensitive to Italian considerations.
[5] Especially
since the slogan used for the recruitment of the battalions included, along with references to
anticommunism, the use of these forces to prevent the return of the king, see
NARS RG 226:83476. According to J. L.
Hondros, Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony 1941-44, N.Y., 1983,
p. 81, Rallis did not originate the security battalions, but the idea came from
General Pangalos, who feared that an allied victory would permit the British to
impose the monarchy on Greece. Rallis accordingly revised Pangalos's proposal by
using fanatical royalist officers instead of republicans. Later on, the security
battalions did attract royalist officers but initially many monarchist officers
made their way to the Middle East or joined ELAS, the remainder preferring to keep
out of the resistance and the puppet government. On this, see: A. Gerolymatos,
"The Role of the Greek Officer Corps in the Resistance," Proceedings of
the International Historical Congress, Dictatorship and Occupation in
Greece, 1936-1944 (forthcoming). On the republican nature of the security
battalions, see: H. Fleischer, "Νέα στοιχεία για τη σχέση των γερμανικών αρχών και ταγμάτων ασφαλείας," Μνήμων, Athens, 1980; G. Seferis, Πολιτικό ημερολόγιο, vol. 1, Athens, 1979, p. 141; L.
Spais, Πενήντα χρόνια στρατιώτης, Athens, 1970,
p. 263.
